What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?

Langland‐Hassan, Peter

doi:10.1017/apa.2020.28

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 55 publications

(88 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…To what extent episodic memory relies on mental imagery is an open issue in the debate. Langland-Hassan ( 2021) maintains that almost all philosophers agree in thinking that mental imagery ("imagistic imagining" in his own terms) is often, if not even always, exploited by episodic memory. The question is more complicated, though, once we acknowledge that the debate has failed to distinguish the two senses of mental imagery I will introduce in §3.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…17 Therefore, actors within the so called "(dis)continuism debate" might risk to talk past each other, if they are using the notion of mental imagery in different senses. Langland-Hassan (2021) has urged the need of clarifying which notion of imagination they refer to. He claims that the relevant notion of imagination in the debate is neither "imagistic imagining", nor "attitudinal imagining", but rather "constructive imagining".…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Imagining in Remembering from the Outside

Arcangeli¹

2022

Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A hot topic in philosophy of memory is the status of observer memories. How can a genuine episodic memory involve the rememberer as an object in the remembered scene? Observer memories seem to be false or otherwise distorted episodic memories. Some voices have been raised against this seemingly straightforward view. Recently, McCarroll has offered new arguments in favour of the idea that observer memories should be legitimately considered as episodic memories, grounding it on an analysis of the perspectivality of imagination (i.e., the fact that, similarly to memory, imagination somehow involves a self or "point of view"). McCarroll argues against accounts that tie imagination to the experienceable, on the grounds that they presuppose an experiencer in the imaginary world, and thus an occupied point of view. According to him these accounts lend force to the idea that observer memories are not genuine memories, if we take for granted that episodic memories rely on imagination so construed. In this chapter I will consider how McCarroll's worries can be used against one of the most promising theories of the imagination, recreativism. My goal is to block this kind of move while agreeing with McCarroll's main tenet that observer memories are genuine memories. More precisely, I will show that, although recreativism links imagination to the experienceable, it is not committed to positing "full-blooded" occupied point of view from which the imagined scene is "experienced". I will do this through a thorough analysis of the imaginative realm, of how experiences and the self (and different types of self) can be involved in our imaginings. I will focus on different strategies open to the recreativist, bringing to the fore the importance of the imagination for a careful study of memory.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Imagining in Remembering from the Outside

Arcangeli¹

2022

Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…1 Their simulationist foes, emboldened by some surprising developments in the sciences of memory, have challenged this claim, insisting that such a causal connection is not necessary (Michaelian, 2016a;Michaelian & Sant'Anna, 2019). 2 While, from 10,000 feet, the two camps seem clearly distinct and well-fortified, a closer look reveals a surprisingly intricate terrain, crisscrossed by a number of unexplored routes between them (Andonovski, 2021;Langland-Hassan, 2021). Still, there is a growing suspicion that, in light of the empirical developments -and perhaps also the evolving nature of theorizing about memory-a "relaxation of the requirement for a strictly necessary and sufficient condition is welcome" (Lewis, 1966, p. 22).…”

Section: Fernández's Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…FTM and STM are sometimes grouped together as "postcausal" on the grounds that the two theories reject "the core claim of the causal theory": that a memory has to be actually caused by a past experience (e.g., Michaelian & Robins, 2018, p. 24). In fact, there have been recent attempts to combine them into one -I am tempted to call it a "superfunctionalist"theory (Langland-Hassan, 2021). I hope that the discussion above hints at why we should be very careful when endeavoring to do so.…”

Section: Causation and Mnemonic Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causation and mnemonic roles: on Fernández’s Functionalism

Andonovski

2021

Estud.filos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Debates about causation have dominated recent philosophy of memory. While causal theorists have argued that an appropriate causal connection to a past experience is necessary for remembering, their opponents have argued that this necessity condition needs to be relaxed. Recently, Jordi Fernández (2018; 2019) has attempted to provide such a relaxation. On his functionalist theory of remembering, a given state need not be caused by a past experience to qualify as a memory; it only has to realize the relevant functional role in the subject’s mental economy. In this comment, I argue that Fernández’s theory doesn’t advance the debate about memory causation. I propose that this debate is best understood as being about the existence of systems, which support kinds of interactions that map onto the relations dictated by (causal) theories. Since Fernández’s functionalism tells us very little about this empirical question, the theoretical gains from endorsing it are minimal.

show abstract

“…Versions of causalism designed to address problems for the classical causal theory have proliferated in recent years (e.g.,Michaelian, 2011a;Perrin, 2021; Sutton & O'Brien forthcoming;Werning, 2020); some of these (e.g.,Bernecker 2008Bernecker , 2010Debus, 2010) are designed primarily to address conceptual problems and thus may provide suitable targets for experimental philosophy.4 Fernández' argument for the functionalist theory of memory(Fernández, 2018(Fernández, , 2019(Fernández, , 2020(Fernández, , 2021a, which is distinct from both the causal theory and the simulation theory, appeals explicitly to our intuitions about hypothetical cases and may thus be of interest to experimental philosophers. SeeAndonovski (2021),James (2021),Robins (2021), andViera (2021) for objections to the functionalist theory.5 Causalism is standardly taken to align with discontinuism and simulationism with continuism, but seeLangland-Hassan (2021) and Sant'Anna (2021) for more nuanced takes on the relationship between the two pairs of views.6 The edited collections cited above focus primarily on the metaphysics of memory. SeeSenor (2019) for a systematic treatment of the epistemology of memory.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental philosophy of memory

Michaelian

Dranseika

Álvarez

2022

Acta Sci. Human Soc. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Experimental philosophy is now some twenty years old and has a large body of work to its credit. Little of this work focusses directly on memory, but it has, as the philosophy of memory has come into its own over the last several years, become increasingly clear that there are numerous questions about the concept of memory to which the tools developed by experimental philosophers might profitably be applied. By describing a sample of these questions, explaining how and why they might be approached using experimental methods, and providing a snapshot of published and in-progress experimental work, this article makes a case for experimental philosophy of memory.

show abstract

What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?

Cited by 15 publications

References 55 publications

Imagining in Remembering from the Outside

Imagining in Remembering from the Outside

Causation and mnemonic roles: on Fernández’s Functionalism

Experimental philosophy of memory

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About