What ‘We’?

Lawford‐Smith, Holly

doi:10.1515/jso-2015-0008

Cited by 36 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…37 For further support for this reading of Pogge's position see Pogge (2013, 310-11). 38 Pogge (2005; 39 Lawford-Smith (2015). 40 Meckled-Garcia (2013, 116-7).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcing the Global Economic Order, Violating the Rights of the Poor, and Breaching Negative Duties? Pogge, Collective Agency, and Global Poverty

Wringe¹

2018

Journal of Social Philosophy

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“…37 For further support for this reading of Pogge's position see Pogge (2013, 310-11). 38 Pogge (2005; 39 Lawford-Smith (2015). 40 Meckled-Garcia (2013, 116-7).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcing the Global Economic Order, Violating the Rights of the Poor, and Breaching Negative Duties? Pogge, Collective Agency, and Global Poverty

Wringe¹

2018

Journal of Social Philosophy

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“…Whether others in the group have the requisite intentional states for the performance of the pattern to constitute an exercise of agency matters greatly. (Lawford-Smith 2015). Nothing I have said here is intended to deny or diminish the significance of these things.…”

Section: The Significance Of Willingnessmentioning

confidence: 98%

Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons

Woodard

2017

Journal of Social Ontology

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Group-based reasons are reasons to play one's part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based reasons in cases where the relevant group is not or would not be itself an agent. According to the behaviourfirst conception, what matters is that the other members of the group would play their parts in the relevant pattern, not whether they would have the cooperative intentional states constitutive of group agency in doing so. This paper argues against these conceptions and in favour of the powers-first conception, according to which what matters is that the members of the group have practically relevant powers.

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“…If such obligations exist, but are not discharged, then that would imply culpability of a group that cannot author actions (Wringe, ; Björnsson, ; Schwenkenbecher, ; Pinkert, ). We think those authors are wrong, because we think collective control, intention, belief, decision, etc., are necessary preconditions for obligation, and so a necessary condition of culpability for failing to discharge obligations (Collins, , 234–5, 238–41; Lawford‐Smith, , 231–33). But if they were right, then that would be yet a further way to argue for culpability for states' actions.…”

Section: If Not Citizens Then Who Is Culpable For What the State Does?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility for states' actions: Normative issues at the intersection of collective agency and state responsibility

Lawford‐Smith

Collins

2017

Philosophy Compass

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Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub‐disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what “the state” is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in particular a moral agent capable of taking moral responsibility for its actions. We have to know what it takes for it to be capable of moral responsibility, e.g., what the functional equivalents in groups (or in that kind of group in particular) are of knowledge, intention, foreseeability, recklessness, and so on. And once we've established that it is an agent, and is responsible for what it does, we have to explain whether and in what way this implicates members, i.e., whether state responsibility distributes to the (compositional) members of states, whoever they may be (“citizens” is one possibility, but there are many). Answers to these questions come from metaphysics, social ontology, action theory, epistemology, political theory, and ethics. In what follows, we'll give an outline of some different ways of answering these questions.

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What ‘We’?

Cited by 36 publications

References 20 publications

Enforcing the Global Economic Order, Violating the Rights of the Poor, and Breaching Negative Duties? Pogge, Collective Agency, and Global Poverty

Enforcing the Global Economic Order, Violating the Rights of the Poor, and Breaching Negative Duties? Pogge, Collective Agency, and Global Poverty

Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons

Responsibility for states' actions: Normative issues at the intersection of collective agency and state responsibility

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