What we know and what to do

Charlow, Nate

doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9974-9

Cited by 49 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The near-orthodox account of conditionals in ordinary language is Kratzer's (1981;1991) restrictor analysis. And as Charlow (2013) and Yalcin (2012) observe, that analysis doesn't validate modus ponens.…”

Section: (6b)mentioning

confidence: 96%

“…The subjective ought, in particular, is not well understood. The recent literature on the Miners Puzzle, initiated by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and developed by Charlow (2013), Cariani, Kaufmann, and Kaufmann (2013), Dowell (2012), von Fintel (2012, and Silk (2014a), discredits a widespread misconception about the subjective ought: that ought claims in natural language must obey classical inference rules like modus tollens. In fact, subjective ought provides a wealth of examples that show that those rules aren't valid.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Understanding how these problems work will help to clarify the motivations for my own proposal (Section 5). Cariani et al (2013) and Charlow (2013) independently give conservative amendments to the orthodox semantics that involve similar basic operations: they introduce a third parameter that, under certain circumstances, coarsens the ordering over worlds. In the Kratzer semantics, the ordering source ordered worlds.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Subjective Ought

Carr¹

2015

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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T his paper concerns the subjective ought in natural language. If you think the apple is poisoned, there's a sense in which you ought not eat the appleeven if, unbeknownst to you, the apple isn't poisoned. This ought, the subjective ought, isn't just sensitive to sources of value in the world: it's also sensitive to what information is available. The objective ought, by contrast, is insensitive to knowledge and ignorance: it's the ought from a God's-eye view.The subjective and objective ought and related expressions (should, arguably must and have to, attitude verbs like want and need, comparatives like better, and so on) aren't technical terms in philosophy. They are a part of natural language, the language we use to express intuitions in ethics, philosophy of action, and decision theory. When we investigate the relations between what we ought to do and considerations like what morality or prudence requires, what we want or intend, what we're able to do, and so on, our claims are expressed in natural language. They reflect the logical structure of natural language. And our theorizing often tacitly makes assumptions about the entailment relations between various considerations and what we ought to do.So we should get clear on how ought and related expressions work in natural language. The subjective ought, in particular, is not well understood. The recent literature on the Miners Puzzle, initiated by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and developed by Charlow (2013), Cariani, Kaufmann, and Kaufmann (2013), Dowell (2012), von Fintel (2012, and Silk (2014a), discredits a widespread misconception about the subjective ought: that ought claims in natural language must obey classical inference rules like modus tollens. In fact, subjective ought provides a wealth of examples that show that those rules aren't valid. In Section 1, I summarize Kolodny and MacFarlane's argument that indicative conditionals don't obey modus ponens, and I provide some new empirical and theoretical arguments against the validity of classical inference rules for natural language conditionals.

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Section: (6b)mentioning

confidence: 96%

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Subjective Ought

Carr¹

2015

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…In recent years, the miners puzzle [11] quickly grabs the attention of lots of deontic logicians [27,6,3,4,8]. The miners puzzle goes like this:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Various solution to this puzzle has been proposed [27,6,3,4,8]. Willer [27] claims that any adequate semantics of dyadic deontic modality must offer a solution to the miners puzzle.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

STIT Based Deontic Logics for the Miners Puzzle

Sun

Baniasadi

2015

Multi-Agent Systems

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Abstract. In this paper we first develop two new STIT based deontic logics capable of solving the miners puzzle. The key idea is to use pessimistic lifting to lift the preference over worlds into the preference over sets of worlds. We also discuss a more general version of the miners puzzle in which plausibility is involved. In order to deal with the more general puzzle we add a modal operator representing plausibility to our logic. We present a sound and complete axiomatization.

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Weak Necessity

Rubinstein

2020

The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Semantics

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Getting the meaning of ought right and accounting for its relation to must has proven to be a considerable challenge for deontic logic as well as formal semantic analyses of modality. This chapter aims to give a language‐independent characterization of weak necessity as a phenomenon of gradable modality, focusing on morphological, semantic, and discursive properties of modals like ought . Weak necessity requires us to distinguish between degrees of necessity. Two theoretical frameworks for doing so are evaluated in the chapter. The two frameworks are shown to have complementary strengths, highlighting the distinction between probability‐based weak necessities and priority‐oriented ones.

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What we know and what to do

Cited by 49 publications

References 16 publications

Subjective Ought

Subjective Ought

STIT Based Deontic Logics for the Miners Puzzle

Weak Necessity

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