What would a Bourdieuan sociology of scientific truth look like?

Abstract

In his last lecture delivered at the Collège de France, Pierre Bourdieu criticizes relativist sociology of science for failing to capture the truly social logic of scientific practice and asserts that his argument of 30 years ago can still work as a corrective to the relativist sociology of science. However, Bourdieu's critics concur that his field theory of science is not only theoretically defunct but also empirically deficient. In this article, I do two things. First, after showing why, in Bourdieu's field theory of science, the distinction between the two explanatory categories deployed by the relativists dissolves, I argue that, contrary to the critics' claims, Bourdieu's field theory of science has the distinctively Bourdieuan elements that sharply distinguish it not only from the Mertonian/Habermasian idealistic view of science but also from that of relativist sociology of science. The second part of this article discusses a sociological study of scientific practice and indicates the way in which Bourdieu's theoretical arguments can be empirically substantiated.

The Idea of Collaboration in the Academy: Its Epistemic and Social Potentials and Risks for Knowledge Generation

“…Moreover, Bourdieu (1975) -who is often (mis)perceived as the sociologist whose major contribution to the understanding of science is through a conceptualisation of scientific practice as solely driven by a conscious calculation on the part of scientists for symbolic capital, dominance and power -claims nonetheless the inextricability of the epistemic and political dimensions of knowledge generation (see also Kim, 2009). As paradoxical as it may sound, because 'the demands of scientificity' (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 41) inscribed in the autonomous field of symbolic production have to be satisfied, 'the pursuit of private scientific interests ... continuously operates to the advantage of the progress of science' (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 32).…”

“…By mobilising social mechanisms of monitoring internal to the scientific field and crossvalidating each other's arguments (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 34), the 'anarchic antagonism of particular interests is converted into a rational dialectic ... [and] transcends itself through a critical correction of all by all' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 20). This becomes, then, the necessary and sufficient condition for the production of 'scientific truth', however problematic its definition may be (Kim, 2009).…”

Habermas on Understanding: Virtual Participation, Dialogue and the Universality of Truth

“…But such universality is made available only by virtue of the scientific field which has ''historicity''. As I have argued elsewhere (Kim 2009), for Bourdieu, scientific truth is not ''a disembodied or a transcendental concept but a collective thing embodied in a historically evolved social space called the scientific field''. least be properly examined, and will not understand why scientist…sharply refuses his request (1967: 541) [my italics].…”

How Objective Is Bourdieu’s Participant Objectivation?

“…In his recounting of the history of sociology of science, Bourdieu criticizes both the Mertonian and the relativist sociology of science for failing to capture the truly social logic of science in which the traditional distinction between the causes of and reasons for scientists" actions and beliefs dissolves. In doing so, Bourdieu reveals his own particular interests as well as his strategies to render the arguments of the relativist sociologists less convincing and persuasive (Kim, 2009). …”