Specialty courts-such as drug courts, mental health courts, or domestic violence courts-tend to assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that particular groups of offenders have unique problems that can be best met with specialized case processing. Put simply, specialty courts assume that offenders themselves are specialists when it comes to offending. There is, however, a criminological fly in the ointment. The problem is that criminological theory and research have long demonstrated that offenders tend to be generalists and that they rarely specialize in any given form of misbehavior. Accordingly, the authors argue here that the notion of the "generality of deviance" presents a problem for the potential effectiveness of specialty courts because they are likely operating on a faulty set of ideas about offending behavior. The authors offer strategies for moving forward to better integrate the notion of the generality of deviance into specialty courts: in particular, embracing a rehabilitative philosophy and adopting well-documented correctional treatment approaches such as cognitive-behavioral interventions and the risk-need-responsivity model. They conclude by highlighting the risks associated with granting system efficiency a position of privilege among the multiple goals of corrections. KEYWORDS generality of deviance; versatility of offending; specialty courts There are currently a lot of specialty courts in the United States. All of it really started with drug courts in the late 1980s, where the first one was established in Miami, Florida, in 1989, which quickly proliferated to over 800 drug courts by the year 2000, and currently there are over 3,000 nationwide (National Institute of Justice, 2018). The development of other kinds of specialty courts-also referred to as "problem-solving courts" (Portillo, Rudes, & Taxman, 2016)-soon followed, including those that deal specifically with criminally involved persons with mental health problems (