When Can Mediators Build Trust?

Kydd, Andrew H.

doi:10.1017/s0003055406062290

Cited by 182 publications

(152 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…However, given the significant rewards rebels are likely to be favourable to the onset of the non-binding process, even when they lack a genuine desire for peace. It is therefore the governmentÕs incentives that tend to determine when mediation occurs (Clayton 2013;Grieg and Regan 2008;Melin and Svensson 2009;Svensson 2007). complicate the resolution process and lower the likelihood of the belligerents finding an acceptable solution (Kydd 2006;Svensson 2007). …”

Section: The Incentives For Settlement In Civil Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

Clayton¹

2016

Cooperation and Conflict

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Civil conflicts within oil-rich states tend to last longer but are less likely to be mediated and end in a peace agreement. This implies that oil-funded conflict is less likely to end through a mediated settlement despite offering a greater opportunity for peaceful resolution. This article builds on this puzzle, focusing on the research question: to what extent does the presence of non-lootable natural resources impact on the onset and outcome of civil war mediation? I argue that oil-wealth raises the relative capacity of the incumbent, making it more challenging for insurgents to force mediation and gain the guarantees against defection that are needed to resolve the problem of credible commitment. This theory is tested on 319 civil conflict episodes between 1946 and 2004. The results support the argument that non-lootable natural resources exert a strong negative effect on both the onset and outcome of mediation. The analysis also reveals that the negative effect of petroleum wealth increases relative to a states hydrocarbon revenue (per capita). This is an important contribution to conflict research focused on natural resources that has previously overlooked the relationship between resource wealth and civil conflict management efforts.

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Section: The Incentives For Settlement In Civil Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

Clayton¹

2016

Cooperation and Conflict

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“…Therefore were all belligerents to have full and accurate knowledge of their opponent, a settlement that divides the contended utility in line with the distribution of capabilities should be achievable (Kydd, 2003;Kydd, 2006;Rauchhaus, 2006).…”

Section: Bargaining Failure In Civil Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation

Clayton

2013

Journal of Peace Research

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To what extent does the relative strength of a rebel movement impact upon the likelihood of a peace settlement in civil conflict? This paper argues that relatively stronger rebels are more likely to overcome the strategic bargaining problems that can prevent the resolution of war. Relatively strong insurgents are better equipped to significantly challenge core government interests, and fundamentally threaten the survival a regime. The incumbent's fear of future violence therefore makes mediation more likely to be undertaken in high-stakes conflicts between states and strong rebel groups. Relatively strong insurgencies are also those with the greatest leverage to negotiate enforcement mechanisms, and the best equipped to defend themselves in the event that the government reneges on an agreement. This reduces the scale of the commitment problem and increases the probability of relatively strong rebel groups agreeing to a settlement with an incumbent. This argument is tested using dyadic data that captures the relative position of insurgents in civil war from 1946 to 2004. This represents an important methodological shift within the mediation literature, which has in the past largely relied upon aggregate country-level data. The results suggest that relatively stronger insurgents are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and eventually concede some form of settlement. This is further evidence of the need to capture the dyadic relations between actors with fine-grained disaggregated data.

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“…in the early 1970s and the Camp David negotiations mediated by Jimmy Carter, in which a third party conveys information back and forth between parties, providing suggestions for moving the conflict toward resolution (see, for example, Kydd, 2006).…”

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confidence: 99%

Mediation, arbitration and negotiation

Goltsman

Hörner

Pavlov

et al. 2009

Journal of Economic Theory

206

125

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Abstract. We compare three common dispute resolution processes -negotiation, mediation, and arbitration -in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the parties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to the third party recommendation. We characterize and compare the optimal mediation and arbitration procedures. Both mediators and arbitrators should optimally filter information, but mediators should also add noise to it. We find that unmediated negotiation performs as well as mediation if and only if the degree of conflict between the parties is low.

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When Can Mediators Build Trust?

Cited by 182 publications

References 45 publications

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation

Mediation, arbitration and negotiation

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