If there are diseconomies of scale in asset management, any predictability in mutual fund performance will be arbitraged away by rational investors seeking funds with the highest expected performance (Berk and Green, 2004). In contrast, the performance of US equity mutual funds persists through time. In this paper, we report evidence that persistence is less prevalent among hard-to-find funds and investigate whether market frictions can reconcile the assumptions of investor rationality and diseconomies of scale with the empirical evidence. In particular, we extend the setting of Berk and Green (2004) to include entry costs and account for investor heterogeneity in financial sophistication, which we model as differences in reservation returns and the degree of financial constrainedness across investors. We show that for low levels of managerial skill, more visible funds, which are available to a broad set of investors, underperform less visible funds, which are only available to the most sophisticated investors. As managerial skill rises, funds with less sophisticated investors can outperform funds with more sophisticated investors, as a consequence of the interaction of entry costs with financial constraints. Therefore, for a range of managerial skill, hard-to-find funds exhibit less dispersion in equilibrium expected performance. Using data on US equity mutual funds in the 1996-2010 period and different proxies for fund visibility, we find empirical evidence that differences in observed performance are significantly less persistent among hard-to-find funds than otherwise similar funds.JEL codes: G2; G23.