What drives MPs' constituency focus in party‐centered systems? Party‐centered systems are expected to offer fewer incentives for constituency‐focused behavior as it is parties rather than candidates that primarily drive competition. However, MPs in these systems may find good reason to cater to constituents’ interests as it allows them to attain multiple goals and satisfy competing principals. This study develops a theoretical model of constituency focus comprising individual, party, and district‐level factors and tests it in South Africa, a party‐centered system. Drawing on 22,724 questions submitted by MPs to the parliament between 2006 and 2023, as well as biographic data and interviews, it demonstrates that variation in MPs' constituency focus is explained by their level of electoral vulnerability, and to a lesser degree their seniority and local ties. Moreover, whether MPs belong to clientelistic parties and their constituency is a party stronghold are also relevant factors. The findings highlight the importance of incentives that go beyond electoral institutions and reaffirm the relevance of constituency links in party‐centered systems.