When dominant parties adopt proportional representation: the mysterious case of Belgium

Abstract

As the first country to introduce proportional representation (PR), Belgium has attracted considerable attention. Yet, we find the existing explanations for the 1899 breakthrough lacking. At the time of reform, the Catholic Party was politically dominant, advantaged by the electoral system, and facing reformist Socialists. Nevertheless, they single-handedly changed the electoral system and lost 26 seats in the first election under PR. We argue that the Catholics had good reasons to adopt PR. Majoritarian rules tend to create high levels of uncertainty because they provide incentives for non-dominant parties to cooperate. Such electoral coalitions are facilitated by multidimensional policy spaces that make electoral coalitions other than between nonsocialist parties possible. PR reduces the effectiveness of cooperation between non-dominant parties, but such certainty comes at a price. In addition, in the presence of dominant parties, divisions over electoral system reform often result in intra-party conflicts that may be more decisive than inter-party conflicts.

An ecological inference approach to the origins of proportional representation

“…In summary, while we acknowledge the possibility of other motivating factors, we propose a general explanation grounded on the structure of competition and instrumental calculation. Although organizations often harbor multiple and potentially conflicting motivations – a phenomenon demonstrated through intra-party divisions regarding PR, as substantiated by comprehensive case studies (Cox et al, 2019; Emmenegger and Walter, 2019; Leemann and Mares, 2014) – our premise assumes that right-wing parties, our unit of analysis, aim to exert control over the legislative apparatus and pre-empt a left-wing majority. These calculations encompass both electoral distortion and the entry of socialist parties.…”

“…This category encompasses approximately half of the early democracies that embraced PR. Rokkan’s (1970) perspective aimed at covering religious parties and cited Belgium, but this extensively scrutinized case, notably examined in studies by Emmenegger and Walter (2019), Barzachka (2014), Ahmed (2010), and Calvo (2009), showcases a distinct scenario where the socialist threat rationale does not directly apply.…”

Partisan districting and the adoption of proportional representation: gerrymandering and its discontents

“…Fourth, constitutional provisions might limit the potential for districting. For instance, the Belgian constitution requires regular reapportionment, which made it impossible for the Catholic Party to rely on malapportionment before the adoption of PR in 1899 (Emmenegger and Walter, 2019). In contrast, the Swiss Liberals benefited from regular reapportionment.…”