When even the prime minister sits on the municipal council. Analysing the value of ‘localness’ and Finnish MPs’ incentives to ‘cumulate’ in an open-list voting system

Abstract

This article addresses a curiously neglected question, namely why do the vast majority of Finnish MPs—one of the highest levels in the world—hold a seat on the municipal council? The basic presumption is that Finnish parliamentarians are not first and foremost ‘office-seekers’; they do not seek municipal council office as a primary goal. Rather, they view municipal elections as a means of attaining localness, either as a personal vote-earning attribute (PVEA) or then as a representational attribute, bolstering their credentials as ‘local MP’ for the municipality. To test this reasoning, the analysis focuses on MPs’ decisions on whether to contest the four municipal elections between 2008 and 2021 (n = 796). The results show that the incentive to ‘cumulate’ is greatest for first-term legislators and those occupying marginal list positions at the previous general election, but that the incidence of dual mandate-holding does not rise systematically with the size of the municipality whilst national celebrity trumps localness as the primary vote-earning attribute. The evidence is also consonant with the view that dual mandate-holding is as much a representational merit as an electoral imperative.

Less is more or the more the merrier? Analysing attitudes towards multiple‐mandate holding among local officeholders

“…However, both the Centre Party and the Finns Party stand out with their somewhat polarised attitudes on the matter. Hence, the broad cross‐party consensus towards this practice in Finland, as suggested by Arter and Söderlund (2023, p. 97), might be somewhat of an exaggeration.…”

“…This especially in comparison to the extensive research done in France, Belgium and other countries where the practice is commonly occurring (François, 2013; Navarro, 2009; Van de Voorde, 2019b). Arter and Söderlund (2023, p. 97) even describe the scale of the Finnish cumul as ‘exceptional in [a] comparative perspective’. Moreover, Finland has been claimed to constitute a deviant case regarding multiple‐mandate holding because it has traditionally been theorised to function as a ‘compensation mechanism’ in highly centralised states with weak and fragmented local governments, where this practice provides local decision‐makers with direct access to the central government (Navarro, 2009; see also Sandberg, 2014).…”

“…Second, the Finnish variant of the preferential voting system (OLPR) is argued to be particularly incentivizing towards personal vote‐seeking since citizens are required to vote for a single candidate on one of the party lists and because the candidate nomination process is described as inclusive and decentralised (Arter, 2021; Arter & Söderlund, 2023). The competition for votes is fierce both between rival parties and between candidates of the same party (copartisans), which is reflected in the frequent occurrence of intraparty incumbency defeats (see Arter & Söderlund, 2023, p. 82). One way for Finnish politicians to enhance their chances of being (re)elected is, therefore, by fostering their local‐level experience and renown or ‘localness’, which can be viewed as an important candidate resource (Arter & Söderlund, 2023, p. 87).…”

“…In Finland, mandate accumulation across institutional levels has been noted to be ‘routine’ among politicians (Arter, 2021, p. 350; see also Sandberg, 2014) and the institution of the cumul has even been described as ‘deeply embedded in the Finnish political culture’ (Arter & Söderlund, 2023, p. 82). This is arguably at least partly due to the candidate‐centeredness of the compulsory preferential voting system used in Finland (Arter & Söderlund, 2023; Karlsson, 2018; Sandberg, 2014), as preferential voting has been shown to favour notable candidates, such as incumbents, since they are more appealing than unknown candidates (Dewoghélaëre et al, 2006; Navarro, 2009). Moreover, in early 2022 Finland held elections for a new regional government tier of 21 so‐called ‘welfare districts’ ( hyvinvointialueet ) based on historic counties, responsible for organising social and welfare services.…”

Finland: Political Developments and Data in 2021

“…The open‐list character of Finnish elections makes them significant for intraparty contest (von Schoultz & Papagergiou 2021). The localness, electoral strategies and dual mandates of the 2021 elections were discussed publicly in Finland, and have also been subject to scholarly analysis (Arter & Söderlund 2022). In the interparty contest, they contested popularity of KOK and SDP in the cities, and the viability of the Centre Party/Suomen Keskusta (KESK) in their more rural support areas.…”