When Farmers Use ‘Pieces of Paper’ to Record Their Land Transactions in Francophone Rural Africa: Insights into the Dynamics of Institutional Innovation

Land Tenure and the “Evidence Landscape” in Developing Countries

“…In spite of the government having provided settlers with land titles, in some cases settlers have cleared much more land than they can cultivate in an effort to secure their claim (Fernside 1986; Postel 1988). Other examples of clearing land to create evidence of occupation where effective institutions are lacking can be found in the Philippines (Uitamo 1999), Uganda (Aluma 1989; Mulley and Unruh 2004), Cameroon (Delville 2003), Zambia (Unruh, Cligget, and Hay 2005), and Sierra Leone (author's fieldwork: Unruh 2005).…”

“…Delville (2003) notes the derivation of evidence (informal pieces of paper) and procedures that attest to land transactions in several countries (Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Benin, Senegal) in the absence of institutions and laws to handle such evidence (also Andre 2003). This absence, however, does not prevent such evidence from having great utility as an informal argument, a way to “make the case” for the existence of rights (Deville 2003). In effect such pieces of paper participate in the translation of landscape evidence–boundary represented in pieces of paper, and witnesses whose signatures attest to boundary location.…”

“…The recognition of the role of informal legalities in the absence of institutions is not new. A significant body of literature focuses on law, culture, and society issues that deal with land claiming and dispute settlement without courts, order without law, law as social process, the “shadow of the law,” and folk law (Moore 1973, 2000; Ellickson 1991; Renteln and Dundes 1995; Nader 1997; Delville 2003). Therefore the real utility of such evidence is that it creates an informal “legal discourse” (Blomley 1994) of claim based on what is commonly thought to be legitimate and workable forms of evidence of claim.…”

“…However strong the response by the state for the provision of the necessary security via institutions and title, trust in these can frequently be low, and as a result so will their effectiveness (Platteau 1996). Moreover, the evolutionary theory assumes that customary landholders do not innovate or derive solutions to problems and are essentially powerless, which of course is not the case (Delville 2003). Thus, although both the adaptation paradigm and the evolutionary theory involve change over time, the orientation of the two are distinct, and this article focuses on the former.…”

Carbon sequestration in Africa: The land tenure problem

“…This is particularly the case as mechanisms for disseminating and enforcing such laws (especially with agrarian, semi-literate populations) are also weak or non-existent. Previous analysis of this disconnect has examined its pervasiveness, history, and many problems ranging from agricultural development and investment, to nation building and afforestation and reforestation projects (e.g., Cleaver, 2003;Delville, 2003;Unruh, 2006;Guadagni, 2002;McAuslan, 2003;de Moor and Rothermund, 1994;Renteln and Dundes, 1994;Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994). Thus the extent and nature of the tenurial disconnect is well known, but unfortunately not integrated into the carbon sequestration literature.…”