When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma

Wang, Chaoqian; Zhu, Wenqiang; Szolnoki, Attila

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2023.129033

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…2 b. Upon obtaining the accumulated payoffs π , we convert them into fitness, denoted as 21 , 48 , 61 , 62 . Strategies that yield higher fitness are more likely to reproduce.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs

Wang,

Perc,

Szolnoki

2024

Nat Commun

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Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an arbitrary number of strategies on graphs is still missing. Here, we solve this by drawing an analogy with the Balls-and-Boxes problem, based on which we show that the local configuration of multiplayer games on graphs is equivalent to distributing k identical co-players among n distinct strategies. We use this to derive the replicator equation for any n-strategy multiplayer game under weak selection, which can be solved in polynomial time. As an example, we revisit the second-order free-riding problem, where costly punishment cannot truly resolve social dilemmas in a well-mixed population. Yet, in structured populations, we derive an accurate threshold for the punishment strength, beyond which punishment can either lead to the extinction of defection or transform the system into a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle. The analytical solution also qualitatively agrees with the phase diagrams that were previously obtained for non-marginal selection strengths. Our framework thus allows an exploration of any multi-strategy multiplayer game on regular graphs.

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“…2 b. Upon obtaining the accumulated payoffs π , we convert them into fitness, denoted as 21 , 48 , 61 , 62 . Strategies that yield higher fitness are more likely to reproduce.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs

Wang,

Perc,

Szolnoki

2024

Nat Commun

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“…confidence [35][36][37][38][39][40], aspiration [41,42], heterogeneity [43] and memory [44] have also been proven to be important for promoting cooperation. Within the domain of reputation-based mechanisms, the blueprints of how individual reputation is determined and how the corresponding social norms influence cooperation evolution have been roughly established [45].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Zhu,

Wang,

Wang

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game. Specifically, the reputation type of a group, either good or bad determined by a reputation threshold, modifies the nonlinear payoff structure described by a unified reputation impact factor. Results show that this reputation-based incentive mechanism could effectively promote cooperation compared with linear payoffs, despite the coexistence of synergy and discounting effects. Notably, the complicated interactions between reputation impact and reputation threshold result in a sharp phase transition from full cooperation to full defection. We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. We further extend our framework to heterogeneous situations and show how the variability of individuals affect the evolutionary outcomes. Our work provides important insights into facilitating cooperation in social groups.

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Evolution of trust in structured populations

Wang

2024

Applied Mathematics and Computation

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When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma

Cited by 6 publications

References 46 publications

Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs

Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Evolution of trust in structured populations

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