Following a flurry of interest after World War II, for many years, the United States of America was the outlier in nationalism studies, and the American Civil War an awkwardly anomalous nationalist conflict in the period of near-unremitting warfare that was the nineteenth century. Neither the nation itself nor the war that secured it as such fitted comfortably into the prevalent paradigms of national construction and conflict, predicated as these usually were on European examples (Grant 106-107). At the same time, and specifically when it came to the Civil War, American scholars have long been keen to claim a global significance for their internecine war. The title alone of Charles Roland's study of the Civil War, An American Iliad, offered a clue, but its author made the point explicitly when he argued that, just as the "victory of the Greeks forever changed the course of Western history, and thereby of world history," so the Union's victory in the Civil War "forever changed the course of American history, and thereby of world history" (Roland xi). Since Roland's study appeared some two decades ago now, the impulse to position the United States, but specifically the South and the Civil War, within a global context has gathered momentum. In some respects, however, this particular historiographical trajectory was for a time working backwards from the global conflicts of the twentieth century. Two notable cases in point were the collections of essays edited by Stig Forster, Jorg Nagler, Manfred F. Boemeke and Roger Chickering that sought to compare the Civil War with the contemporaneous German Wars of Unification within an analytical framework focused on the progression toward "total war." By contrast, the two works under consideration here are not driven to emphasize, as Roland did, that it was America's existence as a single nation, and later Superpower, that altered the course of world history, nor by any imperative to interpret its civil war as in some ways establishing the martial parameters of twentieth-century conflict. Instead, they position the nationalist forces that both drove and were produced by America's civil war firmly in the context of those at play in the nineteenth century. In so doing, they seek to establish an American stake in the European nationalism academic dialogue from which the United States has largely been excluded via its perceived position as an internally-focused, discrete civic nation, rather than one at the heart of those nationalist trends that influenced nineteenth-century Europe. In this respect, each very much reflects