In recent years, embodiment theories have become a major conceptual framework for understanding the mind, including the social mind (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Schubert & Semin, 2009). The idea of embodiment theories is that higher level processing is grounded in the organism's sensory and motor experiences; hence, such frameworks are often called grounded cognition theories (Barsalou, 2008; Wilson, 2002). According to embodiment theories, processing of information about, for example, tools, flavors, melodies, driving directions, emotional faces, social and personality characteristics, and even abstract social, moral, emotional, or motivational concepts, along with many other kinds of information, is influenced, informed, associated with, and sometimes dependent on perceptual, somatosensory, and motor resources. In this chapter, we illustrate advances in the power of this account of how information processing works and discuss where new limits and challenges are being revealed. The structure of the chapter is roughly as follows. We begin by contrasting embodiment theories with their main competitors-theories that emphasize the amodal, propositional nature of mental representations. We then review some evidence for embodied processing in more cognitive domains. We then move on to a detailed description of research on embodied processing's role in emotional perception and emotional language comprehension, the role of embodied metaphor in understanding interpersonal relations and morality, and the role of mimicry in social judgment. Finally, we discuss the