When justice answers to the president: Reexamining the effect of cabinet partisanship on human rights in presidential democracies

2020

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A body of literature suggests that states with independent courts are more likely to protect human rights. A recent article challenges this notion by arguing that when both the president and his or her justice minister share the same party-i.e., they are copartisans-that state is less likely to protect human rights, as justice ministers may value their loyalty to the president over their duty to enforce court decisions. In this article, I estimate government respect for human rights accounting for both copartisan justice ministers and an independent judiciary. In the end, I find copartisan justice ministers to be negatively associated with high government respect for human rights, even after controlling for judicial independence. Many constitutions already seek to ensure an independent judiciary, but if copartisan justice ministers increase the likelihood that governments repress, then perhaps constitutional engineers should also consider options that would reduce the likelihood that both the president and his or her justice minister share the same party.

Section: Copartisans and Court Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Samplementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The effect of copartisan justice ministers on human rights in presidential democracies

2020

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Reevaluating the presidential runoff rule: Does a provision promote the protection of human rights?

2019

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In recent years, an increasing number of democracies have adopted a runoff rule to elect their president. Some have argued, however, that the benefits of such a rule are dubious at best. In this article, I seek to counter this claim, as I posit that a runoff rule promotes the protection of human rights by reducing outcomes that are negatively associated with high government respect for human rights. Using ordered logistic regression and an analysis of predicted probabilities, I find that democratic presidential elections held using a runoff rule produce presidents that are less likely to be associated with lower government respect for human rights, and more likely to be associated with greater government respect for human rights. I conclude by suggesting that politicians should consider embracing a presidential runoff rule, as its adoption could be a relatively easy way to reduce repression.

Nationalism and human rights: A replication and extension

2019

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A recent article has found nationalism to be negatively associated with government respect for several human rights. In this article, I replicate the original study’s findings, I demonstrate that these findings are robust to an alternate model specification, and I then extend the analysis to additional human rights not examined by the original author. Ultimately, I find that in comparison to when the chief executive is not nationalist, when the chief executive is highly nationalist, that state is less likely to be associated with high government respect for six ‘empowerment’ rights (i.e. the freedoms of assembly and association, electoral self-determination, speech, foreign movement, religion, and worker’s rights), and more likely to be associated with low government respect for these six empowerment rights. This study suggests that nationalism’s influence on human rights is greater than previous thought.