When moving without volition: Implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects

Dogge, Myrthel; Schaap, Marloes; Custers, Ruud; Wegner, Daniel M.; Aarts, Henk

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.10.014

Cited by 97 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…It is of interest that we could replicate only effect-binding but not action-binding, the latter having been shown in several other studies (Dogge et al, 2012; Barlas and Obhi, 2013; Wolpe et al, 2013). This lack of replication might be explained by the following facts: Firstly, in the present study participants were asked to report “the first moment of their finger movement” rather than the time they pressed the button.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 56%

“…Additionally, one can assume that preceding brain activity has a stronger influence on effect-binding when the action is intrinsically generated rather than triggered by external imperative stimuli. For instance, stronger effect-binding was reported in the voluntary action condition as compared to an involuntary action, though inducing the belief of self-causation could modulate the effect-binding (Dogge et al, 2012). There is strong evidence indicating that negative deflections of the spontaneous fluctuating SCPs are associated with an increasing probability of neural firing (Birbaumer et al, 1990).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The intentional binding paradigm was applied in a number of experiments to study human agency, such as self-causation (Dogge et al, 2012), action selection (Barlas and Obhi, 2013), shared actions (Strother et al, 2010), uncertainty of the effect (Wolpe et al, 2013), emotional states (Yoshie and Haggard, 2013), affective valence (Takahata et al, 2012) and beliefs in free will (Aarts and van den Bos, 2011). Although many studies have assessed how intentional binding is modulated, the underlying neural mechanisms remain relatively unexplored (Moore and Obhi, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The readiness potential reflects intentional binding

Jo¹,

Wittmann²,

Hinterberger³

et al. 2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When a voluntary action is causally linked with a sensory outcome, the action and its consequent effect are perceived as being closer together in time. This effect is called intentional binding. Although many experiments were conducted on this phenomenon, the underlying neural mechanisms are not well understood. While intentional binding is specific to voluntary action, we presumed that preconscious brain activity (the readiness potential, RP), which occurs before an action is made, might play an important role in this binding effect. In this study, the brain dynamics were recorded with electroencephalography (EEG) and analyzed in single-trials in order to estimate whether intentional binding is correlated with the early neural processes. Moreover, we were interested in different behavioral performance between meditators and non-meditators since meditators are expected to be able to keep attention more consistently on a task. Thus, we performed the intentional binding paradigm with 20 mindfulness meditators and compared them to matched controls. Although, we did not observe a group effect on either behavioral data or EEG recordings, we found that self-initiated movements following ongoing negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (SCPs) result in a stronger binding effect compared to positive potentials, especially regarding the perceived time of the consequent effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence that the early neural activity within the range of SCPs affects perceived time of a sensory outcome that is caused by intentional action.

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 56%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The readiness potential reflects intentional binding

Jo¹,

Wittmann²,

Hinterberger³

et al. 2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Dogge et al (2012) observed IB even in the absence of a voluntary action. In that study, the effect of an involuntary passive key press was perceived shifted toward the key press when participants believed that the passive key press caused the effect.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mine is Earlier than Yours: Causal Beliefs Influence the Perceived Time of Action Effects

Haering¹,

Kiesel²

2012

Front. Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When a key press causes a stimulus, the key press is perceived later and the stimulus earlier than key presses and stimuli presented independently. This bias in time perception has been linked to the intention to produce the effect and thus been called intentional binding (IB). In recent studies it has been shown that the IB effect is stronger when participants believed that they caused the effect stimulus compared to when they believed that another person caused the effect (Desantis et al., 2011). In this experiment we ask whether causal beliefs influence the perceived time of an effect when the putative effect occurs temporally close to another stimulus that is also an effect. In our study two participants performed the same task on connected computers with separate screens. Each trial started synchronously on both computers. When a participant pressed a key, a red and a yellow stimulus appeared as action effects simultaneously or with a slight delay of up to 50 ms. The participants’ task was to judge the temporal order of these two effect stimuli. Participants were either told that one participant caused one of the two stimuli while the other participant seated at the other computer caused the other stimulus, or each participant was told that he/she caused both stimuli. The different causal beliefs changed the perceived time of the effects’ appearance relative to each other. When participants believed they each caused one effect, their “own” effect was perceived earlier than the other participant’s effect. When the participants believed each caused both effects, no difference in the perceived temporal order of the red and yellow effect was found. These results confirm that higher order causal beliefs change the perceived time of an action effect even in a setting in which the occurrence of the putative effect can be directly compared to a reference stimulus.

show abstract

“…As we have argued earlier (Synofzik et al, 2009a), the fact that perceived time intervals between movement and effect were decreased by priming also in case of involuntary movements opens up the possibility that the binding between movement and effect might not be specific to agency and intentionality, but can also present—at least in part—a more unspecific effect linked to temporal binding between two external events (in this case between the two congruent sounds, i.e., between prime and effect). Indeed, recent studies suggest that intentional binding is neither linked specifically to motor predictive processes (Desantis et al, 2012a; Hughes et al, 2013) nor to agency (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012; Dogge et al, 2012), but rather to causality in general. However, even if the phenomenon of binding of movements to their effects was not specifically linked to agency, it could still contribute to the experience of agency, for instance, by accentuating subject’s perception of the temporal contiguity between movements and their effects (Desantis et al, 2012a).…”

Section: Affective Influences On the Sense Of Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Affective coding: the emotional dimension of agency

Gentsch

Synofzik

2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The sense of agency (SoA) (i.e., the registration that I am the initiator and controller of my actions and relevant events) is associated with several affective dimensions. This makes it surprising that the emotion factor has been largely neglected in the field of agency research. Current empirical investigations of the SoA mainly focus on sensorimotor signals (i.e., efference copy) and cognitive cues (i.e., intentions, beliefs) and on how they are integrated. Here we argue that this picture is not sufficient to explain agency experience, since agency and emotions constantly interact in our daily life by several ways. Reviewing first recent empirical evidence, we show that self-action perception is in fact modulated by the affective valence of outcomes already at the sensorimotor level. We hypothesize that the “affective coding” between agency and action outcomes plays an essential role in agency processing, i.e., the prospective, immediate or retrospective shaping of agency representations by affective components. This affective coding of agency be differentially altered in various neuropsychiatric diseases (e.g., schizophrenia vs. depression), thus helping to explain the dysfunctions and content of agency experiences in these diseases.

show abstract

When moving without volition: Implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects

Cited by 97 publications

References 22 publications

The readiness potential reflects intentional binding

The readiness potential reflects intentional binding

Mine is Earlier than Yours: Causal Beliefs Influence the Perceived Time of Action Effects

Affective coding: the emotional dimension of agency

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About