When Orders of Worth Clash: Negotiating Legitimacy in Situations of Moral Multiplexity

Abstract

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link When Orders of Worth Clash: Negotiating Legitimacy in Situations of Moral Multiplexity AbstractHow is moral legitimacy established in pluralist contexts where multiple moral frameworks co-exist and compete? Situations of moral multiplexity complicate not only whether an organization or practice is legitimate but also which criteria should be used to establish moral legitimacy. We argue that moral legitimacy can be thought of as the property of a dynamic dialogical process in which relations between moral schemes are constantly (re-)negotiated through dynamic exchange with audiences. Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot's "orders of worth" framework, we propose a process model of how three types of truces may be negotiated: transcendence, compromise, antagonism. While each can create moral legitimacy in pluralistic contexts, legitimacy is not a binary variable but varying in degrees of scope and certainty.

The Five Paradoxes of Meaningful Work: Introduction to the special Issue ‘Meaningful Work: Prospects for the 21st Century’

“…Here, we can draw links between the meaningful work literature at the micro level and the institutional theory literature at the macro level. According to Reinecke et al (), at a general level the institutional logics literature proposes widespread moral schemes that integrate cognitive, normative, and coercive features into a set of prevailing logics relevant for each institutional field. However, a more nuanced approach is suggested by the orders of worth framework (Boltanski and Chiapello, ; Boltanski and Thévenot, ; Lafaye and Thévenot, ).…”

“…Thus, any activity that does not contribute to the benefits of wider society in some way fails to meet the criteria for legitimacy. There are eight potential sources of moral legitimacy that actors or institutions may draw upon to substantiate their worth: inspired worth (creativity); domestic worth (kinship); fame worth (reputations); civic worth (the common good); market worth (reciprocal profit); industrial worth (efficiency); projective worth (connectivity and flexibility); and green worth (environmental) (Reinecke et al, , p. 41). Thus, under situations of dispute over the worth of a particular activity when there is an imperative to justify, actors can draw upon one or more of these to show how the activity contributes to issues of shared humanity and thereby be deemed worthy.…”

“…Thus, under situations of dispute over the worth of a particular activity when there is an imperative to justify, actors can draw upon one or more of these to show how the activity contributes to issues of shared humanity and thereby be deemed worthy. Nevertheless, accounts of worthiness remain fragile and subject to challenge and contestation, and the dominance of one at a given time may be considered merely a ‘temporary truce’ (Reinecke et al, ). This is illustrated in Florian et al’s study, where volunteers’ framing of their work as meaningful was embedded within a shifting discursive context concerning the status of refugees.…”

“…How do individuals switch between orders to sustain meaningfulness or, conversely, avoid meaninglessness? How do individuals negotiate meaningfulness in situations of moral multiplexity (Reinecke et al, ).…”

Policy conflict: The influence of fiscal targets on reform of New Zealand's natural disaster fund

“…Boltanski and Thèvenot's framework views a compromise as not privileging one order of worth over another, an assumption that in many environments, may be unrealistic. Reinecke, van Bommel, and Spicer () extend the framework by identifying two further ways to suspend a clash between orders, an antagonistic truce, or by transcendence.…”