When performance shortfall arises, contract or trust? A multi-method study of the impact of contractual and relation governances on performance in Public-Private Partnerships

Fang, Fei

doi:10.26116/center-lis-1932

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Understanding the cyclical processes through which the two types of governance unfold over time warrants a dynamic perspective on interorganizational governance, which is eminently provided by both the longitudinal character of the case research and the system dynamic nature of the formal model. We collected and analyzed longitudinal field data, partly retrospective but mostly real-time, from four cases of large government projects involving public-private collaborations between Regional Water Authorities (RWAs), which in the Netherlands provide, among other services, wastewater treatment services to households and industries, and their contractors (Fang, 2019). Theory generation took place using data from two of the studied projects as they developed very differently and hence could be considered polar cases (Pettigrew, 1990): both projects suffered from major setbacks, yet one project recovered, while the other project collapsed and "went down the drain," that is, the publicprivate collaboration was ended prematurely.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Down the drain: The dynamic interplay of governance adjustments addressing setbacks in large public–private projects

Fang,

van der Valk,

Vos

et al. 2023

J of Ops Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Large government projects involving public–private collaborations inherently suffer from setbacks such as delays, cost overruns, or failure to meet contracted performance. Such setbacks may effectively be addressed through adjustments to contractual and relational governance; yet to date, the dynamics of governance adjustments and their interplay in addressing setbacks is not well understood. This research presents a dynamic theory of how parties can effectively address project setbacks through adjustments to contractual and relational governance. The dynamic theory was generated using longitudinal case data from two large public–private projects in the Netherlands that faced comparable project setbacks but deployed opposing governance adjustments, leading to drastically different project outcomes (i.e., collapse vs. recovery). This theory was then elaborated through two more cases and evidence from the literature. A system dynamics simulation model was then built that reproduces the different governance adjustments and outcomes observed in the four projects and serves to extend theory building. The refined theory not only shows under what conditions adjustments to contractual or relational governance are most effective, but also that governance adjustment interplay may trigger unintended side effects. As such, the theory explains why the careful balancing of governance adjustments is critical to project outcomes.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%