When Philosophical Argumentation Impedes Social and Political Progress

Rooney, Phyllis

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01568.x

Cited by 18 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…On the one hand, it featured those who defended the idea of an essential, minimally adversarial core in argumentation and, at the same time, offered new ways to conceptualize this core (Aikin 2011(Aikin , 2017Casey 2020). On the other hand, there were those who claimed that adversariality is eliminable from argument (though many of them agreed that adversariality was appropriate in some contexts) (Bailin and Battersby 2017;Hundleby 2010Hundleby , 2013Rooney 2010Rooney , 2012. The debate also motivated attempts at formulating normative theories that made the appropriateness of arguing adversarially dependent on the context of the individual argument (Stevens 2016(Stevens , 2019Stevens and Cohen 2018).…”

Section: A Short History Of the Current Adversariality Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Adversariality in Argument

Stevens

Casey

2021

Topoi

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Section: A Short History Of the Current Adversariality Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Adversariality in Argument

Stevens

Casey

2021

Topoi

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“…In recent decades, much has been written on adversariality in argumentation. In particular, a number of authors have argued against conceptualizations of argumentation (in philosophy as elsewhere) as inherently adversarial (Moulton 1983 ; Gilbert 1994 ; Cohen 1995 ; Rooney 2012 ; Hundleby 2013 ; Bailin and Battersby 2017 ). Many (but not all) of these authors formulated their criticism specifically from a feminist perspective.…”

Section: Critiques and Defenses Of Adversariality In Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who’s Afraid of Adversariality? Conflict and Cooperation in Argumentation

Novaes

2020

Topoi

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Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should (ideally at least) never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality (when suitably conceptualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are (and should be) adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them.

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“…As Phyllis Rooney notes with regard to the marginalization of women in philosophy, failure to take seriously anecdotal evidence about specific experiences may actually constitute a form of testimonial injustice. On her view, demands for better evidence “function as a stalling move, particularly when collecting the requested data would take significant time and energy which would normally place the burden of proof back on the members of the marginalized group” (Rooney , 329). For Rooney, women's reports of their experiences are evidence that should be taken seriously, even if they do not warrant definitive causal explanations of women's underrepresentation in philosophy.…”

Section: The Challenge Of the Foreignermentioning

confidence: 99%

Being a Foreigner in Philosophy: A Taxonomy

Erlenbusch¹

2018

Hypatia

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The question of diversity, both with regard to the demographic profile of philosophers as well as the content of philosophical inquiry, has received much attention in recent years. One figure that has gone relatively unnoticed is that of the foreigner. To the extent that philosophers have taken the foreigner as their object of inquiry, they have focused largely on challenges nonnative speakers of English face in a profession conducted predominantly in English. Yet an understanding of the foreigner in terms of the nonnative speaker does not exhaust the conceptual space of the foreigner. This article provides a more nuanced conceptual apparatus that allows for a more precise identification and discussion of other ways in which one can be a foreigner in philosophy. I develop a taxonomy of different conceptions of the foreigner, namely the linguistic, material, cultural, and epistemic foreigner; I discuss the different and specific challenges they face; and I show how foreigners enrich philosophical practice.

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When Philosophical Argumentation Impedes Social and Political Progress

Cited by 18 publications

References 13 publications

Introduction: Adversariality in Argument

Introduction: Adversariality in Argument

Who’s Afraid of Adversariality? Conflict and Cooperation in Argumentation

Being a Foreigner in Philosophy: A Taxonomy

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