When speaking with a single voice isn't enough: bargaining power (a)symmetry and EU external effectiveness in global trade governance

Rival Regulatory Regimes in International Environmental Politics: The Case of Biosafety

“…This is an important finding which ties nicely into recent research findings that qualify the expectation of the EU's effectiveness in global trade governance (e.g. Da Conceição‐Heldt ). On a global scale, the EU's effectiveness in international environmental governance might therefore relate more to its bargaining power and the relative position of the EU vis‐à‐vis other influential actors than to its role as an attractive market and source of aid and assistance (e.g.…”

Multiple Principals’ Preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations

“…Others show how growing capabilities, preferences and entrepreneurship lead to more emancipation of the agent from principals (Niemann and Huigens 2011). Yet others investigate how agents are able to weaken principals' incentives to control (Delreux and Kerremans 2010;Heldt 2017), how national administrations maintain their capacity to control the agent (Adriaensen 2016), and how internal cohesiveness together with the bargaining context shapes the external effectiveness of the EU in trade negotiations (Conceição-Heldt 2014;Elsig 2013;Niemann and Bretherton 2013). This contribution complements the other chapters assembled in this edited volume, for example Niemann and Plank's study of the conditions under which agents are more likely to acquire more discretion vis-à-vis the principals (Plank and Niemann this volume), Helwig's examination of how agent interaction affects the EU High Representative's level of discretion (Helwig this volume) and Kroll's piece on the Council having different mechanisms of control at its disposal to control the European Council (Kroll this volume).…”

Market Power Europe and new EU trade policies

“…For example, as Larik (this volume) shows, there is potential for inconsistency between the EU's general treaty objectives and other more specific policy-based objectives, 10 While a number of scholars have identified different types of practical or policy inconsistency in EU external action, the discussion herein focuses upon what might be called 'internal' and 'horizontal' inconsistency within, between or among different policies (Gebhard 2011). 11 For a discussion of how coherence relates to EU external effectiveness in global trade governance, see da Conceição-Heldt (2014). such as trade policy.…”