Where have China’s state monopolies gone?

The dark side of board network centrality: Evidence from merger performance

“…SOEs also enjoy the implicit guarantee of the government (Wei & Wang, 1997), have easier access to loans and the capital market (Sapienza, 2004;Yang & Tang, 2017), and possess monopolistic power in the product market (Duan & Saich, 2014;Hubbard, 2016).…”

Centrally administered state-owned enterprises’ engagement in China’s public–private partnerships: a social network analysis

“…CSOEs in China are designated to produce the public goods related to the national security and economy, thus they have superior access to the financial, physical, and human capital and monopolize in the key sectors in the nation (Hubbard, 2016). CSOEs can primarily mobilize and exchange resources that are property-based and capital-intensive.…”

State ownership may not be bad: Based on bibliometric research (2002–2021)

“…After examining the SOE sectors, Yu (2014) proposed a detailed discussion on the rapid ascendancy of SOEs in China, a global corporate giant, with the accumulation of huge revenues and profits through competition with other foreign enterprises. Hubbard (2016) suggested that, in terms of the concentration of aggregators (energy, resource, and automobiles), China's SOEs have a monopoly in main sectors, which could increase the speed of the development of the Chinese economy. As argued by Yu (2014), the SOE sector's monopoly status limited private sectors to access strategy and non-strategy industrial sectors.…”