Where Help Is Needed Most? Explaining Reporting Strategies of the International Trade Union Confederation

Abstract

How do international non-governmental organizations select countries for naming and shaming? I argue that three focal actors influence non-governmental organizations’ shaming decisions: inter-governmental organizations, governments, and non-governmental organization members. Moreover, drawing on existing research, non-governmental organizations might respond differently to focal actors’ preferences, by either targeting states that have been criticized by focal actors or, alternatively, targeting those who have escaped their scrutiny. To test these propositions, the article conducts multiple interviews and gathers original data on shaming within the International Trade Union Confederation during period 1991–2011. The main findings are threefold. First, focal actors, except governments, have a significant influence on International Trade Union Confederation shaming. The members’ preferences regarding which states should be singled out have the strongest impact. Second, the International Trade Union Confederation is likely to adopt a bandwagoning strategy by shaming states that have been targeted by focal actors, rather than focusing on states that have escaped their criticism. Third, as a result of the bandwagoning approach, the International Trade Union Confederation mainly targets states with poor labor rights conditions.

Promoting international labour standards: The ILO and national labour regulations

“…I identify three possible answers. First, one reason not to ratify is to escape the rigorous ILO monitoring, the substantive reporting requirements and the risks of public naming and shaming (Koliev, 2020a(Koliev, , 2020bKoliev and Lebovic, 2018). ILO shaming has been identified as one of the reasons for states to be reluctant to ratify conventions.…”