Where to Draw the Line Between Air and Land Battle,

Abstract

ADDRESSING THE services' congressionally mandated Roles and Missions review, Gen Merrill A. McPeak, at the time chief of staff of the Air Force, suggested that modern land warfare contains four "battles"--the rear battle, which includes base and supporting elements, the close battle, where the main opposing ground forces engage one another, the deep battle, incorporating hostile territory well beyond the line of contact, and the high battle, the area of air and space combat. He proposed a division of responsibility between these areas on the battlefield where the ground forces commander would fight the close and rear battles, while the air forces commander would fight the deep and high battles.General McPeak went on to say that the commander with responsibility for the close battle does not require systems or capabilities that reach across the boundaries into the deep and high battles. If there are such systems in the field or on the drawing board, they might be good candidates for retirement or transfer to another service. Alternatively, the commander with responsibility for the deep battle does not need forces that are configured for direct support of close combat operations. If there are any, they too could be transferred or cut. 2General McPeak has suggested that commanders should have full command authority and ownership of the assets used in their respective battle areas. If adopted, this concept would give the Army responsibility for its own close support, eliminating close air support as an Air Force primary function.3 This proposed arrangement would be similar to the close-air-support concept of operations practiced by the Marine Corps. Needless to say, General McPeak's suggestions have stoked old flames of debate between the air and land services.The Army has questioned the Air Force's sincerity about providing air support since World War I, when the airplane gained its importance as a new weapon of warfare. Ground commanders saw the chief task of the Air Force as support for the ground forces. Army field service regulations in effect when the United States entered World War I stated, "The infantry is the principal and most important arm, which is charged with the main work on the field of battle and decides the final issue of combat. The role of the infantry . . . is the role of the entire force. . . ." 4 While the infantry got bogged down in the trenches in World War I, advances in weapons technology and doctrine for employment, including that for the airplane, began to demonstrate revolutionary capabilities for warfare. Airmen believed airpower should be concentrated instead of divided evenly between individual ground commanders. Document Classification unclassified Classification of SF298 unclassified Classification of Abstract unclassified Limitation of Abstract unlimited Number of Pages 212 direct support of the ground advance. . . . Control of the air having been quickly gained, they were able to harass the movement of troops with virtually no interference. 5A German instruction on "The Empl...

Joint Fire Coordination Challenges in Optimizing Employment of Advanced NSFS Weapons

“…14 The Air Force views the FSCL as that transition point at which other services possessing assets with the range capable of engaging targets beyond the FSCL should play a supporting role to the primacy of air battle that is taking place. 22 Thus, desire for autonomy of control of its own weapon systems has produced disagreement between the services over control of deep operations and subsequently shifted the focus of the controversy to the application of the perceived joint fire control boundary, the FSCL.…”