Which form of agreement works for communitybased management? A case study from southwestern Madagascar

Abstract

Aware that humans and nature are inseparably linked many organisations in Madagascar support the community-based natural resource management approach to promote the international policy of biodiversity conservation and protection. In this context, community associations have been introduced to transfer management and use rights for natural resources to the local population. However, the fast, donor-driven top-down procedure of establishing new rules contradicts the local rhythm and handling of rules. Against this background, this paper focuses on the ethnic group Tanalana and explores key actors and locally initiated rules and agreements, analyses their level of effectiveness and discusses their possible application for community-based natural resource management in the buffer zone of Tsimanampesotse National Park in southwestern Madagascar. The paper looks at an example of rule negotiation outside the community-based management context concerning the use of a key resource in raising livestock. The example demonstrates that, on the one hand, the overlapping memberships in different social and kinship groups, and on the other hand, different individual economic interests can hinder successful collective action for natural resource management. Moreover, this example shows that already existing or newly introduced rules can be further called into question and are variously interpreted depending on the context. The degree of sanctions depends on several factors: (i) frequency of transgression, (ii) amount of affected persons, (iii) social relationships between the concerned parties and (iiii) social and communicative behaviour of the transgressor (in the past and present). This study finds that rules serve as rough guidelines, as a basis for discussion in cases of transgression, but do not function as fixed prescriptions. The data for this study was collected through semi-structured interviews and participative observation in six fokontany (village and related hamlets) to the east and west of Tsimanampesotse National Park.

Role‐playing games in natural resource management and research: Lessons learned from theory and practice

“…Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2002). This is also supported by Thielsen's () observation that local decision‐making processes in the Mahafaly Plateau region are complex and take long time periods.…”

Analyse des textes juridiques et de la littérature sur les systèmes de tenure vivante à Madagascar

“…La plupart des études comportant des détails sur les droits aux terres de pâturage se sont concentrées sur le plateau de Mahafaly (Moizo 2001 ;Goetter et Neudert 2016 ;Thielsen 2016), la région d'Atsimo Andrefana (Horning 2004) et la région du Menabe (Fauroux 2001, Scales 2011 Lorsque des pâturages considérés comme un bien commun sont convertis en terres agricoles, des conflits surgissent parfois entre éleveurs et agriculteurs. Cela a été le cas à Bevary, près de la réserve d'Ankarana dans le nord de Madagascar, où le fokonolona a autorisé un agriculteur à creuser un canal et à défricher un champ dans une partie où les pâturages sont gérés en commun (Gezon 1999).…”

“…Il y a 20 à 30 ans, dans certaines régions du sud-ouest de Madagascar, les habitants ont commencé à réclamer la privatisation des droits en réponse à la pénurie d'arbres fourragers appelés « samatas » (Goetter et Neudert 2016 ;Thielsen 2016). L'encadré 3 décrit l'éventail des droits qui existent désormais pour les « samatas ».…”

Identifying Key Knowledge Gaps to Better Protect Biodiversity and Simultaneously Secure Livelihoods in a Priority Conservation Area

“…Local people's knowledge has been shown to provide important insights for sustainable land management and use of resources in south-western Madagascar [132]. Several authors have shown that to achieve effective conservation in Madagascar, every ethnic group should be integrated from the start [133,134]. More use should be made of existing forms of traditional, local agreements and institutions, because such local rules are generally more adhered to [133,135].…”