Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Prasetya, Yunus

doi:10.1086/715203

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 53 publications

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“…The bad lot objection challenges the grounds for assuming that the best (or the true) hypothesis is indeed among the ranked candidates (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 142 ff). The topic is still at the centre of scholarly attention (Dellsén, 2017a, 2021; Prasetya, Forthcoming; Schupbach, 2013; Tesic et al, 2017). The time seems ripe to reap the philosophical fruits of the cognitive sciences and use them to cook a concrete answer to the bad lot objection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Casting inference to the best explanation's lot with active inference

Beni

2023

Theoria

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This paper draws on the resources of computational neuroscience (an account of active inference under the free energy principle) to address Bas van Fraassen's bad lot objection to the inference to the best explanation (IBE). The general assumption of this paper is that IBE is a finessed form of active inferences that self-organising systems perform to maximise the chance of their survival. Under this assumption, the paper aims to establish the following points: first, the capacity to learn to perform explanatory inferences comes with evolutionary privileges; second, adaptive actions guide beliefs and beliefs are action-oriented; and third, IBE is not inconsistent with (approximate) Bayesianism but plays a heuristic role to it. K E Y W O R D Sbad lot objection, free energy principle, inference to the best explanation | INTRODUCTIONThis paper canvasses a reply to the notorious bad lot objection to the inference to the best explanation (IBE). The bad lot objection challenges the grounds for assuming that the best (or the true) hypothesis is indeed among the ranked candidates (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 142 ff). The topic is still at the centre of scholarly attention (Dellsén, 2017a(Dellsén, , 2021 Prasetya, Forthcoming;Schupbach, 2013;Tesic et al., 2017). The time seems ripe to reap the philosophical fruits of the cognitive sciences and use them to cook a concrete answer to the bad lot objection. Motivated in this fashion, the paper argues that the natural (abductive) process of ranking the available hypotheses would, by the same act (i.e., active inferential processes), pick up a lovely/likely enough hypothesis. 1 To achieve its goal, the paper draws on the scientific notion of 'active inference' under the free energy principle (FEP) to reinforce three reactions to the bad lot objection. These reactions-dubbed respectively 'privilege', 'force majeure' and 'retrenchment'-have been anticipated (and then ruled out) by Bas van Fraassen (van 1 We do not elaborate on the distinction between loveliness and likelihood in this paper. Suffice to say that, aside from likeliness of theories, Lipton's account of IBE also considers inferential virtues of loveliness-for example, precision, mechanism, unifying power, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness (Lipton, 2004, p. 122). For an explanation to be the best one, it should be picked up by both criteria of likelihood and loveliness.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Casting inference to the best explanation's lot with active inference

Beni

2023

Theoria

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Inference to the Best Explanation: An Overview

Cabrera

2022

Handbook of Abductive Cognition

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In this article, I will provide a critical overview of the form of non-deductive reasoning commonly known as "Inference to the Best Explanation" (IBE). Roughly speaking, according to IBE, we ought to infer the hypothesis that provides the best explanation of our evidence. In section 2, I survey some contemporary formulations of IBE and highlight some of its putative applications. In section 3, I distinguish IBE from C.S. Peirce's notion of abduction. After underlining some of the essential elements of IBE, the rest of the entry is organized around an examination of various problems that IBE confronts, along with some extant attempts to address these problems. In section 4, I consider the question of when a fact requires an explanation, since presumably IBE applies only in cases where some explanation is called for. In section 5, I consider the difficult question of how we ought to understand IBE in light of the fact that among philosophers, there is significant disagreement about what constitutes an explanation. In section 6, I consider different strategies for justifying the truth-conduciveness of the explanatory virtues, e.g., simplicity, unification, scope, etc., criteria which play an indispensable role in any given application of IBE. In section 7, I survey some of the most recent literature on IBE, much of which consists of investigations of the status of IBE from the standpoint of the Bayesian philosophy of science.

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That’s Not IBE: Reply to Park

Prasetya

2021

Axiomathes

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Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Cited by 5 publications

References 53 publications

Casting inference to the best explanation's lot with active inference

Casting inference to the best explanation's lot with active inference

Inference to the Best Explanation: An Overview

That’s Not IBE: Reply to Park

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