Which Properties are Represented in Perception?

Experiential Content and Naïve Realism

“…I think this is incorrect. My view on this matter isn t novel some have argued that there is a relatively weak interpretation of the claim that experience has content that Naïve Realists can and should accept (see Siegel 2010 andSchellenberg 2011 But ) differ with previous compatibilists on two issues. First, pace Siegel and Schellenberg, I think there is an argument for the claim that experience has content in the weak sense that is more effective than the ones hitherto offered.…”

“…However, one could hold that locutions of the form it appears to S that p are potentially ambiguous, sometimes picking out epistemic appearances and sometimes picking out perceptual appearances )f that s right then the debate is not trivial as I will argue in section 3, it boils down to a debate over whether there is a kind of perceptual appearance that it appears to S that p is used to pick out Thanks to Adam Pautz for pressing me to clarify this point.) 4 (ere s how the taxonomy of views ) ve just offered relates to some of the others in the literature: Susanna Siegel (2010) If perceptual experience has content in any of these three senses, there are a number of matters arising. To name just a few: first, as I hinted in the discussion of the notion of non-propositional experiential content, we must determine the nature of the propositions that can be experiential contents e.g., whether they are Fregean-style propositions composed of senses, Russellianstyle ordered pairs of objects and relations, or perhaps coarse-grained sets of possible worlds.…”

“…One argument for the Mild Content View is the argument from accuracy (Siegel 2010(Siegel : 337-43, 2011. It runs as follows:…”

Visual Endurance and Auditory Perdurance

“…In this case, a general identity is attributed by virtue of perceptually representing an object as having a kind-property like ''being a pine tree'' or ''being a tiger'' (e.g. Siegel 2006). It is believed that such a type of perceptual recognition is largely independent from background knowledge.…”

The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program

“…Perhaps the most systematic contribution to the study of perceptual phenomenal intentionality is due to Susanna Siegel (2005Siegel ( , 2006a, who argues that high-level properties are represented in perception. ese include causation, meaning, and kind properties.…”