Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon

Müller, Wieland; Tan, Fangfang

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.007

Cited by 33 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Second, a large body of the literature suggests that a joint decision-making process may make people more rational in a number of settings, including ultimatum games, beauty-contest games, signalling games, and centipede games (see, for example, Charness and Sutter (2012) and Kugler et al (2012) for a survey), although they could behave more cooperatively if reputation concerns are strong in repeated setups (e.g., Gillet et al 2009, Kamei 2016, Müller and Tan 2013. If twoperson pairs behave more like a game theorist in our experiment, pairs would decrease their willingness to punish through communication.…”

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confidence: 99%

Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-Making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Kamei

2017

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:Past research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. However, it at the same time suggests that such third-party punishment may not be strong enough to enforce cooperation norms in dilemma situations. This paper experimentally compares the effectiveness of third-party punishment between different enforcement formats. Consistent with past studies, our data shows that having an individual third-party punisher in a group does not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity. It also shows that third-party punishment is not effective when two individuals form a pair as a punisher and jointly decide how strong third-party punishment they impose. However, third-party punishment can be sufficiently strong to enforce cooperation norms when a third-party punisher's action choice is made known to another individual third-party punisher in a different group, or when there are two independent individual third-party players in a group.JEL classification: C92, D01, H49

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confidence: 99%

Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-Making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Kamei

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…Barros and Olivella (2011). Studies investigating team decisions show that while teams decide more selfishly than individuals in ultimatum, trust and dictator games (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998;Kugler et al, 2007;Luhan, 2009) evidence on team decisions in repeated games are mixed (Bornstein et al 2008;Raab and Schipper, 2009;Müller and Tan, 2013) As an indicator for altruistic behavior, we considered the difference to the Nash equilibrium profits. In both treatments, the pre-merger Nash equilibrium profits are 8 Taler for each hospital.…”

Section: Team Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Further, the evidence on repeated team decisions in oligopoly games is ambiguous (Bornstein et al, 2008;Raab and Schipper, 2009;Müller and Tan, 2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

Quality competition and hospital mergers—An experiment

2017

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“…On the basis of a Stackelberg game, an answer to the second question is given by Müller and Tan (2011). 6 In their Stackelberg experiment, they study a market for a homogeneous product on which two firms sequentially compete in quantities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I conduct a Stackelberg experiment using Huck et al's (2001) market structure, which is also used by Müller and Tan (2011), in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as firm decision making or implement-ing an organizational structure is more effective for generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by two-member teams.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is a “Firm” a Firm? A Stackelberg Experiment

Hildenbrand

2013

Economics

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Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms, especially when it comes to oligopoly theory. Experimental industrial organization, therefore, faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals "firms"! This experimental approach is not in line with modern industrial organization, according to which a firm's market behavior is also determined by its organizational structure. In this paper, a Stackelberg experiment is considered in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as firm decision making or implementing an organizational structure is more effective for generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by teams. Teams are organized according to a parsimonious version of Alchian and Demsetz's (Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 1972) contractual model of the firm. The author finds teams' quantity choices are more in line with the assumption of profit maximization than individuals' choices. Compared to individuals, teams appear to be less inequality averse. JEL C72 C91 C92 D43 L13

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Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon

Abstract: Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the e¤ect of the time horizon

Cited by 33 publications

References 53 publications

Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-Making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-Making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Quality competition and hospital mergers—An experiment

Is a “Firm” a Firm? A Stackelberg Experiment

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