Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?

Carrubba, Clifford J.; Friedman, Barry; Martin, Andrew D.; Vanberg, Georg

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00557.x

Cited by 86 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…It will be argued here that the court, similar to another type of organization, can have an impact on social responsibility, which encompasses legal, ethical, economic, and discretionary responsibility. Carrubba et al (2012) describe the impact of judicial decisions: ''Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have great public significance. Its opinions direct the decisions of the lower courts, shape public policy, and affect the behavior of private individuals'' (p. 400).…”

Section: Methodology and The Role Of Judicial Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for Understanding Ethical and Efficiency Issues in Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Litigation

2014

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Section: Methodology and The Role Of Judicial Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for Understanding Ethical and Efficiency Issues in Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Litigation

2014

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“…A contrary view, based on the median-voter theorem (Downs 1957), holds that the justice with the median ideology will play the most important role in the process (Anderson and Tahk 2007). Others argue that the median justice in the majority coalition is the key player (Carrubba et al 2011). …”

Section: Strategic Behavior On the Us Supreme Courtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court

Lupu¹,

Fowler²

2013

The Journal of Legal Studies

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Common law evolves not only through the outcomes of cases but also through the reasoning and citations to precedent employed in judicial opinions. We focus on citations to precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court. We demonstrate how strategic interaction between justices during the Court's bargaining process affects citations to precedent in the Court's opinion. We find that the majority-opinion writer relies more heavily on precedent when the Court's decision is accompanied by separate opinions. We also show that diversity of opinion on the Court, a factor often overlooked, has a significant relationship with citations to precedent. Finally, our results indicate that the ideology of the median justice influences citation practices more than ideology of the majority-opinion writer.

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“…10 The median of the majority coalition measure is both widely used (e.g., Carrubba et al 2011;Hansford and Spriggs 2006) and has been shown to be better than existing alternatives (Carrubba et al 2011). As with any indirect measure of ideology, there might be slippage between the actual ideological location of a case and the ideology of the Justices who decided it.…”

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confidence: 98%

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

Uribe¹,

Spriggs

Hansford³

2014

Law Soc Rev

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Studies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legislative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anticipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically substantiate a core part of separation‐of‐powers models of Court–Congress relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on the ultimate content of policy.

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Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?

Abstract: Conventional arguments identify either the median justice or the opinion author as the most influential justices in

Cited by 86 publications

References 16 publications

A Framework for Understanding Ethical and Efficiency Issues in Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Litigation

A Framework for Understanding Ethical and Efficiency Issues in Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Litigation

Strategic Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

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