2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2021.102114
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Who delays climate action? Interest groups and coalitions in state legislative struggles in the United States

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Cited by 23 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Scholars could use these data to uncover coalitions within particular policy domains, regardless of whether they observably coordinate. Analysis could show relations of support and opposition between coalitions and assess their relative influence over legislative outcomes as Culhane, Hall, and Roberts (2021) did for energy policy in Massachusetts (e.g., Culhane, Hall, and Roberts 2021).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Scholars could use these data to uncover coalitions within particular policy domains, regardless of whether they observably coordinate. Analysis could show relations of support and opposition between coalitions and assess their relative influence over legislative outcomes as Culhane, Hall, and Roberts (2021) did for energy policy in Massachusetts (e.g., Culhane, Hall, and Roberts 2021).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This means they presumably have policy preferences, but until recently, we have lacked a way to conceptualize and systematically measure these preferences in the American states. Without standardized and comprehensive data sources, prominent interest group research generally uses qualitative case studies (e.g., Stokes 2020), or systematic data collection in a particular policy area (e.g., Culhane, Hall, and Roberts 2021). In cases where comprehensive datasets of policy preferences were created by hand, which to the best of our knowledge has been limited to studies in Washington, D.C.…”
Section: Data Challenge: the Problem Of Missing Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…11: 240411 influential than this scientific knowledge [12,13], with the result that the scientific community's collective warnings are overridden in decision-making. Historically, fossil fuel companies have been the most profitable companies ever and there is clear and growing evidence that they have used this wealth to influence politics to delay action on climate change and continue with business-as-usual [14]. Some of the influence is direct; the fossil fuel industry spends more than $120 million each year on lobbying USA politicians [15], and £8.4 million has been donated from climate sceptics and fossil fuel interests to the ruling UK Conservative Party since the last election [16].…”
Section: Political Capture By Fossil Fuel and Wider Corporate Interestsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Institutional, political and structural inertia each pose significant barriers to reducing greenhouse gas emissions quickly enough to achieve international targets (Matthews & Wynes, 2022; Mitchell et al., 2018; Seto et al., 2016; Tong et al., 2019; Welsby et al., 2021). Likewise, while many business leaders may view climate inaction as a threat, a number of corporations with vested interest in the continued use of fossil fuels have actively lobbied against action (Brulle, 2021; Culhane et al., 2021). Action from governments is also downstream of public support (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010), but the public has not been particularly responsive to new shifts in temperature (Moore et al., 2019) or to climate disasters (Ogunbode et al., 2019).…”
Section: The Value Of Thought‐leader and Expert Perceptions To Chart ...mentioning
confidence: 99%