Who gets spammed?

Hann, Il-Horn; Hui, Kai Lung; Lai, Yee-Lin; Lee, Sang-Yong Tom; Png, Ivan P. L.

doi:10.1145/1164394.1164399

Cited by 24 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The different sources should be ordered to conform with the convex specification in (6). In a separate field experiment, Hann et al (2006) found that spam was targeted rather than being randomly addressed, which suggests that the marginal cost of sending spam is not zero. We use "cost of solicitation" to refer to all costs incurred in compiling customer addresses and sending solicitations.…”

Section: Settingmentioning

confidence: 98%

Consumer Privacy and Marketing Avoidance: A Static Model

et al. 2008

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We introduce the concept of marketing avoidance--consumer efforts to conceal themselves and to deflect marketing. The setting is one in which sellers market some item through solicitations to potential consumers, who differ in their benefit from the item and suffer harm from receiving solicitations. Concealment by one consumer induces sellers to shift solicitations to other consumers, whereas deflection does not. Solicitations cause two externalities: direct harm on consumers and the (indirect) cost of consumer concealment and deflection. We find that in markets where the marginal cost of solicitation is sufficiently low, efforts by low-benefit consumers to conceal themselves will increase the cost-effectiveness of solicitations and lead sellers to market more. However, concealment by high-benefit consumers leads sellers to market less. Furthermore, concealment by low-benefit consumers increases direct privacy harm, and consumer welfare is higher with deflection than concealment. Finally, it is optimal to impose a charge on solicitations.marketing avoidance, privacy, advertising, promotion, segmentation

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Section: Settingmentioning

confidence: 98%

Consumer Privacy and Marketing Avoidance: A Static Model

et al. 2008

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“…Although spam messages are not entirely random (Hann et al 2006), the term "spam" is used to refer to the indiscriminate use of electronic messaging systems for unsolicited advertisement to consumers. A study by Ferris Research estimates that in 2009, the cost of spam, accounting for decreased user productivity, was about $130 billion, with $42 billion in the United States alone.…”

Section: Privacy and Information Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Privacy

Acquisti

Taylor²,

Wagman³

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

900

406

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“…Similarly, not everyone receives spam. It has been shown that certain email providers are more susceptible to spam that others [57]. Thus, when the probability distribution of harm is varied and known (to the government), actionbased sanctions may be more economically efficient than harm based sanctions.…”

Section: B Case Study 2: Botnet Takedownsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spare the rod, spoil the network security? Economic analysis of sanctions online

Garg

Camp

2015

2015 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime)

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When and how should we encourage network providers to mitigate the harm of security and privacy risks? Poorly designed interventions that do not align with economic incentives can lead stakeholders to be less, rather than more, careful. We apply an economic framework that compares two fundamental regulatory approaches: risk based or ex ante and harm based or ex post. We posit that for well known security risks, such as botnets, ex ante sanctions are economically efficient. Systematic best practices, e.g. patching, can reduce the risk of becoming a bot and thus can be implemented ex ante. Conversely risks, which are contextual, poorly understood, and new, and where distribution of harm is difficult to estimate, should incur ex post sanctions, e.g. information disclosure. Privacy preferences and potential harm vary widely across domains; thus, post-hoc consideration of harm is more appropriate for privacy risks. We examine two current policy and enforcement efforts, i.e. Do Not Track and botnet takedowns, under the ex ante vs. ex post framework. We argue that these efforts may worsen security and privacy outcomes, as they distort market forces, reduce competition, or create artificial monopolies. Finally, we address the overlap between security and privacy risks.

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Who gets spammed?

Abstract: Spam is no random event, but specifically targets those with purchasing power.

Cited by 24 publications

References 2 publications

Consumer Privacy and Marketing Avoidance: A Static Model

Consumer Privacy and Marketing Avoidance: A Static Model

The Economics of Privacy

Spare the rod, spoil the network security? Economic analysis of sanctions online

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