Who'll Stop the Rain? Repeated Disasters and Attitudes Toward Government

Abstract

Objectives. We examine how prior experience with government agencies shapes citizens' assessments of government performance. In Louisiana, two extreme weather events, 11 years apart, required intervention from the state and federal government: Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2016 floods. Were Louisianans' attitudes toward government response shaped by their prior experiences during a natural disaster? Methods. We use an original survey of Louisianans to assess the role of Katrina experience in performance assessments of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Louisiana state government in 2016. Results. We find a significant negative relationship: flood aid applicants in 2016 rated state government much lower, but only if they also applied for Katrina aid. Conclusions. Those with personal experience with FEMA hold lower expectations of state government performance, which deteriorated under the Jindal Administration, and look to the federal government for support. Prior experience with government agencies establishes expectations of responsibility that endure years later.

Public Attention to a Local Disaster Versus Competing Focusing Events: Google Trends Analysis Following the 2016 Louisiana Flood

“…Scholars have studied the 2016 Louisiana Flood from various perspectives (Bosch, ; Bright and Bagley, ; Darr, Cate, and Moak, ; Scott and Errett, ; Yeo, Knox, and Jung, ); however, none focused specifically on the public's attention. Our study contributes to the growing public attention literature by comparing the flood with other disasters of varying types, scale, and scope; we systematically assess the local disaster against national and international events occurring simultaneously.…”

Isn't a Flood a “Rainy Day?” Does the Political Nature of Disasters Impact the Use of States’ Rainy Day Funds?

“…Under pressure from the public, state governments may be tempted to withdraw money from RDFs to cover natural disaster damages even though these funds were originally set up for budget stabilization to smooth revenue cycles. This has implications for skewing the attribution of responsibility for disasters among government levels (see Canales, Pope, and Maestas, ; Darr, Cate, and Moak, ) and for political trust in disaster contexts (see Reinhardt, ). Furthermore, our results show that states will tend to draw down the RDF balance more as disaster damages go up when it is an election year and one party controls the legislature and the governor's office.…”

“…State officials may wish to use such a savings account to maximize their chances for reelection as opposed to the alternatives of increasing taxes or cutting services in the wake of disturbances. Disasters pose, by definition, major disruptions to society (see Canales, Pope and Maestas, ; Darr, Cate, and Moak, ; Reinhardt, ; Yeo and Knox, ). We contend that state governments, faced with the choice of using RDFs, will think about using RDFs instead of making politically more difficult decisions to raise the revenue through other means such as cutting existing expenditures or raising taxes.…”

Resilience, Adaptation, and Inertia: Lessons from Disaster Recovery in a Time of Climate Change

“…This included firing the state's secretary of commerce and reassigning the state's emergency services director. Such behaviors are not uncommon when disaster management tests existing administrative capacity and effort (see Canales, Pope, and Maestas, ; Darr, Cate, and Moak, ). In an effort to bring the crisis to an end, the governor appointed the commanding general of the state's National Guard, the state adjutant general, to take control of all disaster recovery efforts (Zuckerman, ).…”