Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Abstract

It is unclear how international donors' stated commitment to ownership and partnership 'translates' in fragile state or 'post-conflict' settings. The very notion of ownership is violently contested in Afghanistan and donors have to negotiate with, and choose between, multiple state and non-state interlocutors. The developmentalist principles outlined in the 2005 Paris Declaration may carry little meaning in such contexts and their application can have paradoxical effects that impede the emergence of broad-based ownership. The limitations of, and alternatives to, developmentalist approaches in fragile states, are explored here with reference to donor policies and practices in Afghanistan, focusing on the period following the 2001 Bonn Agreement. This paper examines how aid policies and programmes have become part of a complex bargaining game involving international actors, domestic elites, and societal groups. It argues that international donors' failure to appreciate or engage sensitively and strategically with these bargaining processes, when combined with contradictory intervention objectives, has contributed to the steady unravelling of a fragile war-to-peace transition in Afghanistan.

State Building in a Rentier State: How Development Policies Fail to Promote Democracy in Afghanistan

“…We are not the first to take the case of Afghanistan to illustrate the negative effects that aid can have on state formation. Our argument gratefully builds upon the observations of authors such as Ghani et al (), Goodhand and Sedra (), Rubin (, ), Suhrke (, ), and shares some of their conclusions. However, the main shortcoming of the existing literature is that it underestimates the structural consequences of aid rentierism .…”

“…Goodhand and Sedra () and Fearon (2008) favour Afghan‐managed aid, but give more attention to its limitations. The first two authors focus on the limits posed by the presence of substantial reform‐resistant groups within the government and bureaucracy.…”

“…In the aid‐driven urgency to start reforms, donors have selectively worked with a small cohort of largely Western‐oriented technocrats, bypassing ‘reform‐resistant’ ministries, thereby undermining the very principle of domestic ownership. Goodhand and Sedra (: S97) also point to Afghanistan's ‘fragmented sovereignty’: ownership is still very much contested by local power holders and informal institutions. Still, they see no other option in the medium term than for aid to be channelled through the state and geared towards building the fiscal capacity of the state, despite the risk of ‘recreating the rentier state of the past’ (ibid.…”

Exploring Cause–Effect Relationship

“…This will automatically tend to undo whatever good work was done by the Westerners during the 'war to peace transition'. 97 The economy is difficult to improve in the face of the slashed support of the international community and the rising security expenses. The state's own resources are quite insufficient to bear with the expenses of the 350,000-strong army and police.…”

Cidades inteligentes baseadas em tecnologias de informação e comunicação: experiências em regiões urbanas sob a ótica da sustentabilidade

“…Os problemas políticos e econômicos deixaram de ser tratados localmente e passaram a ser vistos de uma maneira mais abrangente, sendo comparados, compartilhados e discutidos entre as nações por conta de suas interconexões e da amplitude de suas consequências (Beck, 2002;Bellin, 2012;Caney, 2005;Goodhand & Sedra, 2010;N. Smith, 2012;Woods, 2005).…”