Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat

Novosad, Paul; Werker, Eric

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2622700

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 48 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Representation, and the politics of representation, intersects with questions of what is expertise, if expertise requires neutrality, and how each interacts with the avowed international character of IOs. Scholars have found Nordic hiring biases within the UN Secretariat (Novosad & Werker, 2014) and questioned economist, South Asian, and native English-speaker influence within the World Bank and the IMF (Kapur et al, 1997; Stern & Ferreira, 1993; Woods, 2003). Such findings contrast with IO commitments for a hiring practice that reflects an internationalist outlook (Article 100.1 of the UN Charter) and expectations that international civil servant loyalty is to the institution, not to one’s home state (Gould & Kelman, 1970; Reymond & Malick, 1986).…”

Section: Tensions Values and Justice: Administrative Study Of Iosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Creating Space for Public Administration in International Organization Studies

Moloney

Rosenbloom

2019

The American Review of Public Administration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The emergent global administrative order includes more than 800 international and regional organizations. Just as the rise of the modern state placed greater importance on the study of public administration, the growth of multistate organizations, their agendas, and personnel require research that draws upon contemporary and classical public administrative thought. This article employs multiple lenses to explore the utility of public administrative theory and empirically based knowledge in analyzing the behavior of international and regional organizations. Specifically, while remaining cognizant of differences between international organizations and sovereign states, we consider the utility of the politics–administration dichotomy, representative bureaucracy, individual and employee due process and other rights, and broader questions of accountability in understanding the administrative life and influence of international organizations in global governance.

show abstract

Section: Tensions Values and Justice: Administrative Study Of Iosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Creating Space for Public Administration in International Organization Studies

Moloney

Rosenbloom

2019

The American Review of Public Administration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Similar to the trade‐off between efficiency and democratic control inherent in bureaucratic autonomy, he identifies ‘a tension between the efforts by the states to control IOs through the staffing policies on the one hand, and the functional and legitimation needs of the IOs as supranational bodies on the other hand’ (Parízek,). Overall, there is robust evidence that member states systematically try to influence IPA staffing (Novosad and Werker,). Thorvaldsdottir contributes to this debate by highlighting the role of voluntary funding as a crucial member state tool of influence.…”

Section: Staff Autonomy In Times Of Contested Financial Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Financial Resources Affect the Autonomy of International Public Administrations

Ege

Bauer

2017

Global Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Voluntary contributions -often earmarked for specific purposes -have become an indispensable source of revenue for international organizations (IOs) and the UN organizations in particular. While the reasons for this trend are regularly studied, its effects on the internal functioning of the organization (especially on the 'international public administration' (IPA) as the organization's secretariat) remain unclear. Given this gap, we study the consequences of increasing financial dependence for the autonomy of IPA staff. Using financial and personnel data of 15 UN agencies over time, our results are in line with the intuitive expectation that more financial resources in the form of voluntary contributions increase the number of staff. We also find evidence, however, that the more an organization depends on voluntary resources (within its broader financial portfolio), the more it reduces the ratio of permanent staff among its total workforce in the subsequent years. The underlying adaption of IPAs' recruitment and career structures to growing financial insecurities has important implications for the autonomy of international bureaucrats and needs to be considered also in terms of its long-term impact on administrative professionalism and organizational performance. Policy Implications• The UN organizations are generally responsive to changes in their fiscal environment. The increasing dependence on voluntary funding leads them to adjust their staffing practices by reducing 'long-term liabilities' in the form of permanent staff.• The observed trend has potentially negative consequences for IPAs' ability to fulfill their mandate because the institutional memory and policy expertise of staff suffers.• Changing staffing patterns may also impair the performance of IPAs as it becomes more difficult for them to attract qualified personnel and keep their current staff motivated.

show abstract

“…Regarding other UN agencies, Thorvaldsdottir (2015) finds that the major donors to these agencies are more than proportionally represented among their bureaucracies. Novosad and Werker (2014) also examine the nationalities of the most senior United Nations Secretariat positions and show that small, rich democracies are most overrepresented there. Parízek (2016) demonstrates that IOs' most powerful members also dominate their secretariats' general staff.…”

Section: Who Work For Ios and Why This Mattersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of International Organizations

Dreher

Lang

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the details of decision-making in IOs the literature shows that a focus on states as the prime actors in IOs overlooks important facets of the empirical reality. Mainly focusing on empirical research, we structure the paper according to the four main actors involved and examine how they influence, use, and shape IOs. We find that IO behavior often reflects the interests of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups, while the impact of voters is limited. The final section discusses proposals for reforms addressing this weak representation of voter preferences.

show abstract

Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat

Cited by 5 publications

References 48 publications

Creating Space for Public Administration in International Organization Studies

Creating Space for Public Administration in International Organization Studies

How Financial Resources Affect the Autonomy of International Public Administrations

The Political Economy of International Organizations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About