Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Whorf? Crosslinguistic Differences in Temporal Language and Thought

Abstract

The idea that language shapes the way we think, often associated with Benjamin Whorf, has long been decried as not only wrong but also fundamentally wrong-headed. Yet, experimental evidence has reopened debate about the extent to which language influences nonlinguistic cognition, particularly in the domain of time. In this article, I will first analyze an influential argument against the Whorfian hypothesis and show that its anti-Whorfian conclusion is in part an artifact of conflating two distinct questions: Do we think in language? and Does language shape thought? Next, I will discuss crosslinguistic differences in spatial metaphors for time and describe experiments that demonstrate corresponding differences in nonlinguistic mental representations. Finally, I will sketch a simple learning mechanism by which some linguistic relativity effects appear to arise. Although people may not think in language, speakers of different languages develop distinctive conceptual repertoires as a consequence of ordinary and presumably universal neural and cognitive processes.

Can a mind have two time lines? Exploring space–time mapping in Mandarin and English speakers

“…Indeed, the present results could also lead to such a conclusion, given that bilingualism triggered the operation of two distinct mental time lines. As January and Kako (2007) have pointed out, however, identifying relationships between the language(s) one speaks and differences in cognition does not necessarily isolate language per se as the causal influence in shaping thought (Boroditsky et al, 2011;Casasanto, 2008). Until alternative explanatory pathways (e.g., cultural convention) can be ruled out and definitive mechanisms elucidated, key questions will remain as to the precise status of the relationship between linguistic experience and cognitive operations.…”

“…1 What this suggests is that sociolin-guistic conventions impact where, in space, temporal constructs are deemed to reside (see also Casasanto, 2008;Chan & Bergen, 2005;Fuhrman & Borodistsky, 2010;Núñez & Sweetser, 2006;Tversky, Kugelmass, & Winter, 1991). Putative cultural differences in space-time mapping give rise to intriguing predictions for a specific group of individuals: Mandarin-English bilinguals.…”

“…In short, the tendency to think about time in spatial terms can be seen to pervade cognition, language, and action. While the grounding of abstract temporal information in concrete spatial representations may be a ubiquitous psychological phenomenon (Barsalou, 2008;Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999, there are nevertheless interesting sociolinguistic variations in the characteristics of this effect (see Casasanto, 2008, for an overview). Take, for example, contrasts between English and Mandarin.…”

Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain

“…Recent research inspired by neowhorfian ideas shows that natural languages shape the way we think about and use concepts [36,37]. Abstract concepts are more detached from sensory experiences, and so could be more affected by linguistic variability than concrete concepts.…”

Embodiment of abstract concepts: Good and bad in right- and left-handers.

“…These primitive target domain representations may be too vague or fleeting to support higher order reasoning about emotional states and may be resistant to the kinds of verbal and imagistic coding that can scaffold such reasoning. Mental metaphors import the inferential structure of source domains like space into target domains, allowing us to envision, measure, and compare the height of people's excitement, the depth of their sadness, or the breadth of their compassion (Boroditsky, 2000;Casasanto, 2008c;Pinker, 1997). To the extent that mental representations in perceptuomotor source domains constitute abstract concepts, these concepts can be instantiated by the same neural and mental structures that simulate perception and action in the physical world.…”