Who set the narrative? Assessing the influence of Chinese global media on news coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African countries

Abstract

The size of China’s State-owned media’s operations in Africa has grown significantly since the early 2000s. Previous research on the impact of increased Sino-African mediated engagements has been inconclusive. Some researchers hold that public opinion toward China in African nations has been improving because of the increased media presence. Others argue that the impact is rather limited, particularly when it comes to affecting how African media cover China-related stories. This article contributes to this debate by exploring the extent to which news media in 30 African countries relied on Chinese news sources to cover China and the COVID-19 outbreak during the first-half of 2020. By computationally analyzing a corpus of 500,000 written news stories, this paper shows that, compared to other major global players (e.g. Reuters, AFP), content distributed by Chinese media (e.g. Xinhua, China Daily) is much less likely to be used by African news organizations, both in English and French speaking countries. The analysis also reveals a gap in the prevailing themes in Chinese and African media’s coverage of the pandemic. The implications of these findings for the sub-field of Sino-African media relations, and the study of global news flows are discussed.

Assessing China's news coverage and soft power in Latin America in the wake of the Belt and Road Initiative (2013–2021)

“…With the rebranding of CCTV's foreign-language news channels in 2016 as China Global Television Network (CGTN) and existing media such as Xinhua, People's Daily , and China Radio International, China implemented its “media going-out policy” to reshape its national image (Morales, 2018; Farah and Mosher, 2010; Madrid-Morales, 2015) and to gain soft power worldwide (Ye and Albornoz, 2019; Wang, 2011; Okuda, 2016). Most literature on the expansion of China's global media operation has focused on Africa (Madrid-Morales, 2021), however. For Latin America, CGTN-Español was intended to convey the Chinese perspective on international issues as well as to share Chinese culture (CGTN, 2020).…”

“…For example, training programs and seminars on development, agriculture, and BRI are widely available for anyone interested (Jenkins, 2021). With the rebranding of CCTV's foreign-language news channels in 2016 as China Global Television Network (CGTN) and existing media such as Xinhua, People's Daily , and China Radio International, China implemented its “media going-out policy” to reshape its national image (Morales, 2018; Farah and Mosher, 2010; Madrid-Morales, 2015) and to gain soft power worldwide (Ye and Albornoz, 2019; Wang, 2011; Okuda, 2016). Most literature on the expansion of China's global media operation has focused on Africa (Madrid-Morales, 2021), however.…”

Counter-hegemonic collaborations or alliances of the underdogs? The case of TeleSUR with Al-Mayadeen, RT and CGTN

“…In the case of the Spanish-speaking world, Beijing’s efforts can be traced to China Radio International in the middle of the 20th century. Its first attempt on television was through a Spanish-French bilingual channel in 2004, which by 2007 separated into two different channels broadcasting in French and Spanish, respectively (Madrid-Morales, 2015). These channels do not focus solely on news, but also include other types of programmes such as documentaries, cultural magazines, cooking shows and fiction series.…”

Belt and Road Initiative-supported co-production films: Film policy and disoriented remembrance of the Silk Road past

“…On 31 May 2021, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party held a collective study session (PCSS) on strengthening and improving international communication. As a venue for policy signalling, the session suggested the Chinese state's continuing and increasing efforts to, as President Xi Jinping (2021) stated, ‘tell Chinese stories, disseminate Chinese voices, and present a real, multidimensional, and comprehensive China.’ Studies, including this Special Issue, have indicated that for around a decade, China has heavily invested in its ‘media going global’ strategy (Madrid-Morales and Wasserman, 2018; Madrid-Morales, 2021; Marsh, 2016, 2018; Thussu et al, 2018). Films are an important part of ‘media going global’, as noted, for example, by Voci and Hui (2017) in their volume on films’ role in China's bid for soft power.…”