Who Should Be in Charge of Cyberspace? The European Union, Member States and the Constitution of Structural Power

Abstract

Cyberspace has evolved as a domain of overlapping and essentially contested authorities. This paper seeks to explore the underlying power dynamics between supranational and national actors within the European Union. I argue that, historically, the persistent securitization of cyberspace has constituted structural power positions that privilege member states and grant them the responsibility of formulating policy responses to new challenges. An empirical analysis of more than 500 speech acts collected from public discourse in Germany and the United Kingdom from 1988 to 2017 shows, however, that securitization has not freed governments from normal politics. Calls for exceptional policies have been vague. The conceptual link between securitization and structural power thus allows for a differentiated view as to who should be in charge of cyberspace. These findings contribute to a better understanding of today's cyberpolitics and the historical constitution of structural power within Europe.