Who Sues Government?: Evidence From the Moscow Theater Hostage Case

Abstract

Courts can better protect rights when citizens are willing and able to litigate in response to government abuses of power. However, if people are not socialized to the possibility of litigating against governments, why do some individuals decide to litigate? Using an original survey of victims in the Moscow theater hostage incident, we find that litigants in a postcommunist context are motivated by political disadvantage, defined as their perception that they are not well represented by political institutions. The effect of political disadvantage on litigation is intensified by the perception that courts, too, are not fair, suggesting that general alienation from the political system may play an important role in the decision to initiate antigovernment litigation in new states.

Suing the Leviathan—An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Rate of Administrative Litigation in China

“…19 Last, higher GDP per capita is associated with better-educated judicial staff. Professional judges may be more capable of following stipulated legal procedures, which attracts more litigants ( Javeline & Baird 2007).…”

The Persuasive Power of Russian Courts

“…If the decisions of Russian high courts were known to Russians-a big "if" that we will discuss below-their decisions may act as such elite cues. Despite the aforementioned reputation challenges, the post-Soviet Russian public has made increasing use of courts and has by some indicators increased its respect for them (Solomon and Foglesong 2000;Machura 2003;Popova 2006;Javeline and Baird 2007). Moreover, the Russian public has been said to favor a "strong hand," to dislike excessive freedom that threatens order, and to respect authority (Fleron and Ahl 1998;Bahry 1999).…”

Suing the Leviathan—An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Rate of Administrative Litigation in China

“…Last, higher GDP per capita is associated with better‐educated judicial staff. Professional judges may be more capable of following stipulated legal procedures, which attracts more litigants (Javeline & Baird ).…”

“…Again, a counterargument can be made about the relationship between wealth and administrative litigation. One study shows that the severity of grievance is a crucial element of the decision to sue the state (Javeline & Baird ). In other words, while victims of two official malfeasances may both file petitions for administrative reconsideration, the one who suffers greater damage is more likely to sue afterward.…”

“…In addition, network influence has been shown to play an important role in litigation propensity (Javeline & Baird ), that is, knowledge of an acquaintance suing the state increases the probability that the person files a similar lawsuit. Compared to rural victims, urban residents experience frequent information exchanges at lower costs.…”