1998
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-47033-2_7
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Who Will Win the Ozone Game?

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Hoel and Schneider (1997) demonstrate this in the framework of a participation game where countries differ with respect to a`non-compliance cost' they incur as non-signatories. This cost is supposed to arise from various exogenous factors like, for example, social norms or trade sanctions (Elster 1989, Heister 1993, Barrett 1997b). Hoel and Schneider show that side payments result in a lower participation rate.…”
Section: Enlargementmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Hoel and Schneider (1997) demonstrate this in the framework of a participation game where countries differ with respect to a`non-compliance cost' they incur as non-signatories. This cost is supposed to arise from various exogenous factors like, for example, social norms or trade sanctions (Elster 1989, Heister 1993, Barrett 1997b). Hoel and Schneider show that side payments result in a lower participation rate.…”
Section: Enlargementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conversely, sanctions can be regarded as the suspension of strategic links. For example, signatories to an IEA may restrict trade with non-signatories in order to deter free riding (Heister 1993, Barrett 1997b. Strategic linkage of trade and environment has the advantage that the automatic links mentioned above are explicitly accounted for.…”
Section: Issue Linkagementioning
confidence: 99%