Who Wins from Emissions Trading? Evidence from California

Grainger, Corbett; Ruangmas, Thanicha

doi:10.1007/s10640-017-0180-1

Cited by 36 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Fowlie et al (2012) found no evidence that emissions sources surrounded by minority and low income populations emitted more under a NO x emissions trading program than in a counterfactual command-and-control policy. Using the same emissions data, but looking at air pollution dispersion models rather than simple circles around facilities, Grainger and Ruangmas (2018) find limited evidence suggesting that facilities "upwind" from African American communities may have higher emissions with a market based instrument.…”

Section: Jel: D63 Q52 Q53mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also examine sensitivity to two alternative dispersion models. Given the prevailing wind direction in most of the region (see figures in Lejano and Hirose, 2005;Schlenker and Walker, 2016;Grainger and Ruangmas, 2018), we consider a specification that places greater weight on facilities to the west; rather than assuming a facility's impacts fall evenly within a circle of 3 km radius, we model facility emissions as falling within a semicircle of 1 km radius to the west and a semicircle of 4 km radius to the east. We also consider a specification using the more sophisiticated HYSPLIT model results of Grainger and Ruangmas (2018).…”

Section: Ranking No X Distributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first assumes that emissions affect census block groups 4 km to the east but only 1 km to the west of each facility. The second uses the weighted treatment area generated by the HYSPLIT model runs used in Grainger and Ruangmas (2018). The appendix provides details on how we calculated exposure levels based on these alternate patterns.…”

Section: A Ranking Policy Outcomes By Generalized Lorenz Curve Dominmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our main specification assumes that the full impact of a facility's emissions is felt in census block groups with centroids within a 3 km radius of the facility. In contrast, Hybrid Single Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT) Model used by Grainger and Ruangmas (2018) assumes that wind and other meteorological and topographical factors spread the impact out out over a much larger geographic area. In this section, we describe how we use weights derived from the Grainger and Ruangmas (2018) HYSPLIT model runs to generate exposure levels in each census block group such that the aggregate amount of pollution generated is comparable to the levels generated by our main specification.…”

Section: For Online Publicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the HYSPLIT specification, w H ij are the weights calculated by Grainger and Ruangmas (2018). As detailed below, the scaling factors s k j are chosen to make the aggregate impact of each facility comparable under the two dispersion model specifications.…”

Section: For Online Publicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Do Pollution Markets Harm Low Income and Minority Communities? Ranking Emissions Distributions Generated by California's RECLAIM Program

Mansur¹,

Sheriff²

2019

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Section: Jel: D63 Q52 Q53mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ranking No X Distributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Ranking Policy Outcomes By Generalized Lorenz Curve Dominmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: For Online Publicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: For Online Publicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Do Pollution Markets Harm Low Income and Minority Communities? Ranking Emissions Distributions Generated by California's RECLAIM Program

Mansur¹,

Sheriff²

2019

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The Environmental Justice Dimension of the Mexican Emissions Trading System

Hernandez-Cortes

Rosas-López

2021

Springer Climate

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Emissions trading systems have the potential of increasing air quality given that GHG emissions are often co-produced with local pollutants such as NOx, SOx, and Particulate Matter (PM). Can emissions trading systems exacerbate or alleviate environmental justice concerns in emerging economies? According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice is achieved when no group is disproportionately affected by an environmental policy or phenomenon. The main objective of this chapter is to estimate the pollution burden faced by marginalized neighbourhoods in Mexico. This is relevant for Mexico given the beginning of the pilot program of the Mexican Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the country’s history of income inequality and poverty. Using linear regression and two-way fixed effects methods, we found that the highest emitters regulated under the ETS are located near poor populations. We estimated a 5$$\%$$ % CO2 emissions-reduction scenario corresponding to national targets and associated NO2 emissions to that scenario. We find that this scenario is consistent with a decrease in the exposure of NO2 pollution for the most marginalized neighbourhoods. This chapter also discusses other potential sources of environmental injustice that could result after the beginning of the ETS and the potential to address them.

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Payments from Households to Distant Polluting Firms

Dijkstra

2022

Environ Resource Econ

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We investigate a novel way to encourage separation between firms, causing local pollution, and their victims (households): payments from households to distant polluting firms. These payments do not require monitoring of firms’ emissions or their abatement costs. In our model, households and firms can choose from two locations (A and B, with A larger than B). Households incur environmental damage from firms in the same location. Under laissez faire, payments from households in one location (say A) to firms in the other location (say B) will prompt firms to move from A to B and to stay there, thus reducing damage to households in A. The maximum that households are willing to pay temporarily is the amount that currently makes them indifferent between A and B. The payments make A less attractive to firms as well as to households. The unique positive-payment equilibrium implements the global welfare optimum where laissez faire does not. We examine from which starting points this payment equilibrium can be reached.

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Who Wins from Emissions Trading? Evidence from California

Cited by 36 publications

References 19 publications

Do Pollution Markets Harm Low Income and Minority Communities? Ranking Emissions Distributions Generated by California's RECLAIM Program

Do Pollution Markets Harm Low Income and Minority Communities? Ranking Emissions Distributions Generated by California's RECLAIM Program

The Environmental Justice Dimension of the Mexican Emissions Trading System

Payments from Households to Distant Polluting Firms

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