Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

Wang, Xinhui; Wang, Xianyu; Su, Yingsheng

doi:10.1016/j.apm.2012.07.007

Cited by 28 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Incentive contracts in SCs are mostly used to distribute risks and benefits due to coordination of the chain members (Giannoccaro, Pontrandolfo 2004). The most popular incentives in the literature are wholesale contracts (Gerchak, Wang 2004;Wang et al 2013), buy-back (Ding, Chen 2008), revenue sharing (Gerchak, Wang 2004;Giannoccaro, Pontrandolfo 2004;Palsule-Desai 2013;Zhou, Yang 2008), quantity flexibility (Tsay 1999), sales rebate (Taylor 2002;Wong et al 2009) and quantity discounts (Klastorin et al 2002;Li, Liu 2006).…”

Section: Incentive Systems In the Scmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Vendor Managed Inventory Systems: How Incentives Can Benefit Supply Chain Partners

Birim

Sofyalıoğlu

2017

Journal of Business Economics and Management

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In a vendor managed inventory (VMI) system, the effects of financial incentives on the entire supply chain (SC) and on the individual firms are investigated in this study. To this end, order management, order replenishment and inventory control activities of a two-echelon SC are examined via modeling using discrete event simulation. By determining the appropriate parameters for the incentives with scenario analysis, balanced profit distribution between buyers and a supplier in VMI is established. Simulation outputs of the traditional model, VMI only and VMI with incentives models are compared based on profits with paired comparisons. In VMI with incentives, both buyers, and the supplier experience higher benefits than the traditional system. This study provides a new method which eliminates the unbalanced benefit distribution due to VMI and offers almost equal benefits to the participating firms. With financial incentives, firms are encouraged to share information with each other to work in a coordinated SC.

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Section: Incentive Systems In the Scmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Vendor Managed Inventory Systems: How Incentives Can Benefit Supply Chain Partners

Birim

Sofyalıoğlu

2017

Journal of Business Economics and Management

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“…To investigate the supply chain parties' behaviours, we apply the simplest wholesale price contract to the supply chain model. The wholesale price contracts are still widely discussed in recently years [5,15,18]. In our paper, we have different focus, we concentrate the bilateral information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wholesale Price Contract Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry

Wang

Guo

Wang

2015

Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing

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This paper investigates the impacts of bilateral asymmetric information in a supply chain. More specifically, we consider a supply chain consisting of one risk-neural manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer who have their private information regarding the manufacturing cost and risk aversion degree, respectively. We first construct a model under the bilateral asymmetric information case using M-V approach. There exists a pair of threshold values of cost and risk aversion degree such that the optimal trading quantity holds. We then give a wholesale price contract under bilateral asymmetric information case to examine the information revealing. We find that the manufacturer and the retailer both announce a lower information type to gain more opportunistically individual profit. This damages the supply chain's performance.

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“…Since the concept of supply chain contract was first introduced by Pasternack [4]; the design of contracts has received a considerable interest. A large number of contracts have been proposed including the wholesale price contract [5][6][7][8][9][10], the quantity flexibility contract [11][12][13][14][15][16], the buy-back contract [17][18][19][20][21][22], the revenue sharing contract [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30], the option contract [31][32][33][34][35], and the cost sharing contract [36][37][38].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

Zhao

Lin

Mao

et al. 2014

Journal of Applied Mathematics

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Cooperation of all the members in a supply chain plays an important role in logistics service. The service integrator can encourage cooperation from service suppliers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the supply chain. A differential game model is established with the logistics service supply chain that consists of one service integrator and one supplier. And we derive the optimal solutions of the Nash equilibrium without cost sharing contract and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the integrator as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the supplier. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole supply chain explicit, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in a logistics service supply chain.

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Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

Cited by 28 publications

References 22 publications

Evaluating Vendor Managed Inventory Systems: How Incentives Can Benefit Supply Chain Partners

Evaluating Vendor Managed Inventory Systems: How Incentives Can Benefit Supply Chain Partners

Wholesale Price Contract Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry

Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

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