Why Animals Can't Act

Stoecker, Ralf

doi:10.1080/00201740902917135

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Some philosophers of action such as Davidson (2001d) and Stoecker (2009), resolutely say 'no.' Many other philosophers of action may say 'yes,' given that they typically distinguish between what we might call "fullblown" agency and merely purposive agency (Alvarez 2009a, footnote 15;Bratman 2007a, p. 197;Butterfill 2001;Davidson 2001d;Glock 2009;Kalis 2011, p. 115;Korsgaard 2009, pp.…”

Section: A Theory Of Merely Purposive Agencymentioning

confidence: 98%

Chimps as secret agents

Arruda

Povinelli

2015

Synthese

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We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more fullblown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities for goal-directed behavior, which solves problems that chimpanzees (and humans) naturally encounter. Thus, it ought not be understood as a deficient instance of human agency.

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Section: A Theory Of Merely Purposive Agencymentioning

confidence: 98%

Chimps as secret agents

Arruda

Povinelli

2015

Synthese

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“…In fact, this is, in one way or the other, maintained by many philosophers (e.g. Derrida, 1992;Oliver, 2009;Stoecker, 2009).…”

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confidence: 86%

Touched by genius: on animals and madmen

Bos¹

2009

South African Journal of Philosophy

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The paper starts with the question, posed by Wittgenstein, whether animals can feign or act as if they are performing in a theatre. It is argued that the idea that they cannot is widespread, not only in philosophy but also in biology or poetry. Animals are generally considered to be too honest for that. A second question is whether there are people who are too honest for feigning or acting. Foucault's famous discussion about madmen sheds some light on this question. Two concepts play an important role in his discussion: 'innocence' and 'genius'. These concepts are not only discussed in relationship to Foucault but also in relationship to Lorenz and Nietzsche. It will be argued that both concepts play an important role in combating an overly rationalist or logocentric ethics. According to the thinkers discussed in this article, an ethics which denies the animality in man is nothing else but dangerous.Wittgenstein always asked good questions about animals. Here is one from Philosophical Investigations:

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“…For example, Burge names representational states as the relevant condition for mind, which would include insects (2014, p. 400). More restrictive proposals take the use of concepts as a requirement, suggesting that non-human animals in general do not even perceive or act (Hamlyn 1994;Stoecker 2009). Others criticize the idea that concepts are a requirement for mind (e.g.…”

Section: "But Is It Really Cognition?"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Demarcating cognition: the cognitive life sciences

Keijzer

2020

Synthese

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This paper criticizes the role of intuition-based ascriptions of cognition that are closely related to the ascription of mind. This practice hinders the explication of a clear and stable target domain for the cognitive sciences. To move forward, the proposal is to cut the notion of cognition free from such ascriptions and the intuition-based judgments that drive them. Instead, cognition is reinterpreted and developed as a scientific concept that is tied to a material domain of research. In this reading, cognition becomes a changeable theoretical concept that can and must be adapted to the findings within this target domain. Taking humans as the best-established existing example of the relevant material target domain, this central case is extended to include all living systems. To clarify what it is about living systems that warrants their role as cognitive target domain, the new concept of cobolism is introduced as a complement to metabolism. Cobolism refers to the systematic ways in which each living system encompasses structures, processes and external events that maintain the fundamental metabolic processes that constitute the core of each living system. Cobolism is perfectly general, applies to bacterial and human cases alike, and provides a general format to describe wildly different cognitive organizations. It provides a clear target for the cognitive sciences to work on, turning them into what we can call the cognitive life sciences.

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Why Animals Can't Act

Cited by 12 publications

References 6 publications

Chimps as secret agents

Chimps as secret agents

Touched by genius: on animals and madmen

Demarcating cognition: the cognitive life sciences

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