Why attackers lose: design and security analysis of arbitrarily large XOR arbiter PUFs

Wisiol, Nils; Margraf, Marian

doi:10.1007/s13389-019-00204-8

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…In [129], and [130], x-XOR PUF (x ≤ 6)is demonstrated to be robust against attacks since it takes more computational time to achieve the final response. However, there exists a significant correlation between the challenges assigned randomly to any one of the APUF components.…”

Section: E Modeling Attack On Xor Apufmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arbiter PUF—A Review of Design, Composition, and Security Aspects

Hemavathy

Bhaaskaran

2023

IEEE Access

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Hardware security modules play a crucial role in protecting and preserving technologically integrated systems that are used in daily life. They employ cryptographic protocols to secure a system against adversaries. Generally, cryptographic algorithms and security keys are quintessential for maintaining the security of a system. Cryptography uses a secret key to encipher and decipher the data. These secret keys are stored in a non-volatile memory that attackers can easily access. The hardware security primitive, Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a promising alternative for enhancing the security of interconnected devices. A PUF produces an output in response to an input based on physical structure and intrinsic manufacturing variations of an integrated circuit (IC). The generated random response being unpredictable, act as a robust secret key in cryptographic protocols. The first silicon PUF is the Arbiter PUF, which can instantly produce significantly more secret keys based on the input with a lightweight design. Due to its advantage, it is best suited for device authentication in resource-constrained applications employing the Internet of Things (IoT). The PUF is also suitable for applications such as the Internet of Vehicles, the Internet of Medical Things, RFID tags, and smart cards. In this paper, the basic Arbiter PUF design is implemented in ZedBoard to analyze the PUF performance characteristics for 16, 32, and 64-bit responses. A review of Arbiter PUF design, different compositions of Arbiter PUF, their individual characteristics, and vulnerabilities against machine-learning attacks have been presented at their broader best in this paper.

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Section: E Modeling Attack On Xor Apufmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arbiter PUF—A Review of Design, Composition, and Security Aspects

Hemavathy

Bhaaskaran

2023

IEEE Access

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“…However, as l increases, the reliability of XOR Arbiter-PUF degrades severely [5]. In a study, Wisiol et al [59] proposed a majority vote technique to enable the large and reliable design of XOR Arbiter-PUF, hence increase the resistant against ML-attack. A theorem to compute the upper bound of majority voting has been also developed (refer to [59] for the details).…”

Section: Non-invasive Attack Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a study, Wisiol et al [59] proposed a majority vote technique to enable the large and reliable design of XOR Arbiter-PUF, hence increase the resistant against ML-attack. A theorem to compute the upper bound of majority voting has been also developed (refer to [59] for the details). The resilience of Majority Vote XOR Arbiter-PUF against ML-attack has been evaluated using Becker's CMA-ES reliability attack technique [35].…”

Section: Non-invasive Attack Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on the Susceptibility of PUFs to Invasive, Semi-Invasive and Noninvasive Attacks: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Directions

Mispan

Halak

Zwoliński

2021

J CIRCUIT SYST COMP

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Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are considered to be a promising technology that provides a hardware root-of-trust for integrated circuit (IC) applications. PUFs exploit the intrinsic process variations that map a set of challenges to a set of responses. The intrinsic process variations are caused by uncontrollable deviations in the IC manufacturing process, which are unique and random from die to die and wafer to wafer. As the PUF output is device-specific, PUFs can, therefore, be used in IC identification and authentication, and cryptographic key generation. Nevertheless, many different successful attack techniques have already revealed vulnerabilities in certain PUFs, including invasive, semi-invasive and noninvasive attacks. In this work, we survey some of the known attacks on PUFs. We also survey the countermeasures to these types of attack presented in recent literature, and finally, discuss the future challenges. Through this survey, the susceptibility of PUFs to attacks is highlighted and this information may be used to improve the quality of future PUF-based application designs.

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“…Majzoobi et al [33] proposed methods for majority voting of responses and classifying the challenges to different reliability sets in order to increase the stability of the corresponding responses in different environmental situations. However, it is shown that the majority voting-based reliability enhancement schemes are not sufficient due to their need to be executed repeatedly many times and store intermediate voting counts in volatile memory [34], [35]. Reconfigurable PUFs have also been proposed not only for enhancing PUF security but also for improving its reliability.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Secure Lightweight Signcryption Scheme for Smart Grid Communications Using Reliable Physically Unclonable Function

Kaveh

Aghapour

Martín

et al. 2020

2020 IEEE International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering and 2020 IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Syst

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Security has become a main concern for the smart grid to move from research and development to industry. The concept of security has usually referred to resistance to threats by an active or passive attacker. However, since smart meters (SMs) are often placed in unprotected areas, physical security has become one of the important security goals in the smart grid. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been largely utilized for ensuring physical security in recent years, though their reliability has remained a major problem to be practically used in cryptographic applications. Although fuzzy extractors have been considered as a solution to solve the reliability problem of PUFs, they put a considerable computational cost to the resourceconstrained SMs. To that end, we first propose an on-chip-errorcorrecting (OCEC) PUF that efficiently generates stable digits for the authentication process. Afterward, we introduce a lightweight authentication protocol between the SMs and neighborhood gateway (NG) based on the proposed PUF. The provable security analysis shows that not only the proposed protocol can stand secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) adversary model but also provides additional security features. Also, the performance evaluation demonstrates the significant improvement of the proposed scheme in comparison with the state-of-the-art.

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Why attackers lose: design and security analysis of arbitrarily large XOR arbiter PUFs

Cited by 16 publications

References 33 publications

Arbiter PUF—A Review of Design, Composition, and Security Aspects

Arbiter PUF—A Review of Design, Composition, and Security Aspects

A Survey on the Susceptibility of PUFs to Invasive, Semi-Invasive and Noninvasive Attacks: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Directions

A Secure Lightweight Signcryption Scheme for Smart Grid Communications Using Reliable Physically Unclonable Function

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