Why Can An Idea Be Like Nothing But Another Idea? A Conceptual Interpretation of Berkeley's Likeness Principle

Abstract

Berkeley's likeness principle is the claim that ‘an idea can be like nothing but an idea’. The likeness principle is intended to undermine representationalism: the view (that Berkeley attributes to thinkers like Descartes and Locke) that all human knowledge is mediated by ideas in the mind that represent material objects. Yet, Berkeley appears to leave the likeness principle unargued for. This has led to several attempts to explain why Berkeley accepts it. In contrast to metaphysical and epistemological interpretations available in the literature, in this essay I defend a conceptual interpretation. I argue that Berkeley accepts the likeness principle on the basis of (1) his commitment to the transparency of ideas and (2) his account of resemblance, which he sets out in his works on vision. Thus, I provide an explanation for Berkeley's reasons for accepting the likeness principle that, appropriately, focuses on his views concerning ideas and likeness.

Resemblance, Representation and Scepticism: The Metaphysical Role of Berkeley’s Likeness Principle

“…1 As the traditional account has it, after attacking direct realism, that is, the view that we perceive the very qualities of material objects without any perceptual intermediary, Berkeley turns to the representative or indirect realist and tries to undermine the very possibility of our ideas resembling and, hence, representing anything beyond our minds. Allaire (1982), Winkler (1989: 138-39), Dicker (1985Dicker ( , 2011), Bolton (1987Bolton ( , 2008, Dancy (1998), Jacovides (2009), Downing (2011), Hill (2011, Fasko andWest (2020), andWest (2021) are just a few other examples of those numerous commentators who seem to endorse this standard reading of the relevant passages. According to this interpretation, Berkeley used the likeness principle to prove two things: (i.)…”

“…to Berkeley, for instance those like Winkler (1989) who advocate an epistemological defence of the likeness principle. But I think it is not only true of the metaphysical interpretation proposed by Cummins (1966) or the 'middle-way' readings such as Ryan's (2006) 'new metaphysical' andWest's (2021) conceptual reading but even Winkler's interpretation is committed to (i.). As I understand him, his proposal is epistemological only with regard to the justification Berkeley has for the ultimately metaphysical principle concerning the impossibility of any likeness between an idea and a non-idea.…”

“…Ryan (2006) proposes that for Berkeley, just like for Locke, resemblance is a mind-made relation, and since the mind cannot access both the relata, the resemblance relation itself cannot obtain between our ideas and the unperceived material qualities. More recently, West (2021) argues that Berkeley's fundamental commitment to the transparency of our ideas excludes the possibility that an idea be like a non-idea, since it would require, after all, that our ideas have some properties we cannot perceive.…”