Why Can't We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America

Abstract

According to Morris Fiorina, Americans are moderate, tolerant, and ambivalent in their political attitudes. This has always been true and it is, if anything, more true today than in the past. The culture war is almost entirely an elite phenomenon, driven by a small group of activists on the left and right who exert influence far out of proportion to their numbers. It is the elites and activists who are polarized, not the public. In this study we use data from the American National Election Studies and national exit polls to test five major claims made by Fiorina about the state of public opinion in the United States. This evidence indicates that while some of the claims of culture war proponents are overstated, there are deep divisions in America between Democrats and Republicans, between red state voters and blue state voters, and between religious voters and secular voters. These divisions are not confined to a small minority of elected officials and activists—they involve a large segment of the public and they are likely to increase in the future as a result of long-term trends affecting American society.

Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion

“…Fiorina et al (2005) and Fischer and Hout (2006) reach more or less the same conclu-sions. In contrast, Abramowitz and Saunders (2005) suggest that the mass public is deeply divided between red states and blue states and between churchgoers and secular voters.…”

“…In this case, there is clear evidence of polarization between self-identified liberals and conservatives, as well as among party affiliates and political activists (DiMaggio et al 1996;Abramowitz and Saunders 2005;Fiorina et al 2005). Bafumi and Shapiro (2007), analyzing the trend in the mean position of Democrats and Republicans and liberals and conservatives with respect to a large set of political issues, have found that partisans and ideologues are increasingly divided not only on issues such as abortion, gay rights, and the role of religion, but also on issues of race and civil rights.…”

“…It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that after a period of decline in the importance of party identification and ideology, partisan loyalties have started to count more, to the point that, in the middle of the 1990s, their impact on voting behavior reached its highest level in at least 50 years (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;Bartels 2000;Hetherington 2001;Bafumi 2004). Nonetheless, the fact that self-identified Republicans (or conservatives) are more likely to vote for the Republican Party today than they were 30 years ago-and the same is true of Democrats-should not be interpreted per se as a sign of public opinion polarization.…”

“…Conversely, for those scholars who think that polarization is in place when broad ideological or partisan dividing lines exist, even though public opinion polarizes only on certain issues, American public opinion is polarized (Kohut et al 2000;Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002;Greenberg 2004;Mayer 2004;Abramowitz and Saunders 2005;Bafumi and Shapiro 2007).…”

Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks

“…5 But a large slice of the most active voters are polarised. 6 This confusion highlights the importance of understanding the size and organization of political parties.…”