Why Cartesian Ideas of Sense are Innate

Kendrick, Nancy

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00908.x

The Southern J of Philosophy

2000

DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00908.x

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Why Cartesian Ideas of Sense are Innate

Nancy Kendrick¹

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“…See De Rosa (), Ch.3, pp.86‐93 on this. Nancy Kendrick also argues that “non resemblance is not what grounds [Descartes's] commitment to innate sensory ideas.” (Kendrick (), 414) As Kendrick puts it, “even when there is a similarity, the content of these ideas is still innate. Consequently, [Descartes's] commitment to innate sensory ideas is grounded in arguments that show that resemblance does not entail that sensory contents come from without.” ( Ibid ., 416)…”

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Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas

Rosa

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate (Claim A) and caused in us by bodies (Claim B). Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating two questions that need to be kept distinct while inquiring about the origin of ideas: the psychological question of the mechanisms by which we acquire ideas and the metaphysical question of how the content of these ideas is determined. I conclude by proposing a new way of reconciling Descartes's Claims A and B in light of this distinction. On my account, Descartes's very views on innateness explain why bodily states must be causes of sensory ideas. 1 Tad Schmaltz, for example, in Schmaltz (1997), 33, writes that none of the claims Descartes makes regarding sensations is more bewildering than his claim that sensations are innate. I will be assuming throughout the paper that Descartes held a representationalist view of sensation, according to which sensations of color represent-although obscurely and confusedly-material objects. This explains why I will be using "sensations" and "sensory ideas" interchangeably. For a defense of a representationalist reading of Cartesian sensations see

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Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas

Rosa

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…However, such defense (by and large) does not extend to the stronger claim that bodies are the causes of the representational content of sensory ideas. See for example, Kenny (1968); McRae (1972); Adams (1975); Clarke (1982); Cottingham (1986); Williams (1987); Jolley (1990); Wilson (1991); Garber (1993); Nadler (1994); Rozemond (1999); Scott (2000) and Kendrick (2000).…”

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Cartesian Sensations

Rosa

2009

Philosophy Compass

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Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes’ views on sensory representation.

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Why Hume's Counterexample is Insignificant and Why It is Not

Kendrick

2009

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

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Why Cartesian Ideas of Sense are Innate

Cited by 3 publications

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Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas

Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas

Cartesian Sensations

Why Hume's Counterexample is Insignificant and Why It is Not

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