Why Decentralization in <scp>S</scp>outh <scp>A</scp>frica Has Failed

Koelble, Thomas A.; Siddle, Andrew

doi:10.1111/gove.12022

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Despite significant investments, the IFFS has not established an appropriate information system. Various institutional constraints, such as for example the formalised disjuncture between national and provincial government (Koelble and Siddle, 2013), hindered opportunities to flexibly align activities across levels and sectors, as is required for rapid and flexible responses to emergencies (Pereira and Ruysenaar, 2012).…”

Section: Analysis Of the Integrated Food Security Strategy (Ifss)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These include poor inter sectoral consultation (partial boundary structures), a lack of stakeholder engagement (limited inclusiveness), direct control of government with little space for private actors and local governments (limited adaptability), and unclear legal status (limited authority to enforce transformative capacity) (Pereira and Drimie, 2016). Again, this new programme runs the risk to get stranded in a vicious cycle that is characteristic for many South Africa reform plans: "increased regulation is followed by more noncompliance, leaving the citizens without effective governance structures and deepening the rift between the aspirations of the developmental democratic state and its actual achievements on the ground" (Koelble and Siddle, 2013).…”

Section: Practical Use and Relevance Of The Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A diagnostic framework for food system governance arrangements: The case of South Africa

Termeer

Drimie

Ingram

et al. 2018

NJAS: Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although policymakers and scientists are increasingly embracing the food system perspective, it has been poorly reflected in institutional terms. We aim to fill this gap by addressing the question as to what forms of governance are most appropriate to govern food systems in a more holistic way. The article presents a diagnostic framework consisting of five principles: 1) system-based problem framing to deal with interlinked issues, drivers and feedback loops; 2) connectivity across boundaries to span siloed governance structures and include non-state actors; 3) adaptability to flexibly respond to inherent uncertainties and volatility; 4) inclusiveness to facilitate support and legitimacy; and 5) transformative capacity to overcome path dependencies and create adequate conditions to foster structural change. This framework is used to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of three food governance arrangements in South Africa, each of which deliberately aimed to embrace a holistic perspective. Although promising on paper, the outcomes are disappointing because of a reversion to a technical onedimensional problem framing during the implementation, the dominance of single departments, the limited attention to monitoring and flexible responses and the exclusion of those most affected by food insecurity. We conclude that the tensions between the ambitious objectives of the arrangements and the institutional constraints of implementing them can persist because of inadequate resources to facilitate transformative change. Finally, we propose an agenda to further elaborate the framework and improve its practical usefulness.

show abstract

Section: Analysis Of the Integrated Food Security Strategy (Ifss)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Practical Use and Relevance Of The Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

A diagnostic framework for food system governance arrangements: The case of South Africa

Termeer

Drimie

Ingram

et al. 2018

NJAS: Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…6 There is considerable scholarly debate surrounding the sources and implications of the resilience of traditional governance. Proposed explanations on the former range from the continuation of colonial indirect rule (Mamdani, 1996;Ntsebeza, 2005) and state weakness (Herbst, 2000;Koelble & Siddle, 2013) to democratization (Baldwin, 2015), decentralization (Koelble & Li Puma, 2011), and the recognition of group rights (Oomen, 2005). While Logan (2013Logan ( , 2009 and Williams (2010) emphasize the continued trust towards traditional governance, Mamdani (1996) and Ntsebeza (2005) contend that, similar to the colonial period, traditional governance structures are used to spread undemocratic state control.…”

Section: State Governance Capacity and Peacementioning

confidence: 99%

Including chiefs, maintaining peace? Examining the effects of state–traditional governance interaction on civil peace in sub-Saharan Africa

Mustasilta

2018

Journal of Peace Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The continued influence of traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa has sparked increasing attention among scholars exploring the role of non-state and quasi-state forms of governance in the modern state. However, little attention has been given to cross-country and over-time variation in the interaction between state and traditional governance structures, particularly in regard to its implications for intrastate peace. This study examines the conditions under which traditional governance contributes to state capacity to maintain peace. The article argues that the type of institutional interaction between the state and traditional authority structures influences a country’s overall governance dynamics and its capacity to maintain peace. By combining new data on state–traditional authorities’ interaction in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2012 with intrastate armed conflict data, I conduct a systematic comparative analysis of whether concordant state–traditional authorities’ interaction strengthens peace. The empirical results support the argument that integrating traditional authorities into the public administration lowers the risk of armed conflict in comparison to when they remain unrecognized by the state. Moreover, the analysis suggests that the added value of this type of interaction is conditional on the colonial history of a country.

show abstract

“…This issue becomes venerable; therefore it has been widely studied by previous researchers. Decentralization, in some way, may cause macroeconomic instability, clientelism, service delivery failure, and bureaucratic swelling (Englebert & Mungongo, 2016;Koelble & Siddle, 2013;Iry, 2009;Falleti, 2004;Ryan, 2004). Also, Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (2007), see that improving welfare is not possible if there is no accountability and responsibility of the government in managing autonomous funds.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transactional Political Practices in the Asymmetric Decentralization System in Aceh (10-Year Analysis of Special Autonomy Fund Management Period 2008-2018)

Sari

Ghifari

2020

HSSR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose of the study: Within 10 years, the central government of Indonesia has granted the special autonomy fund to Aceh as a strategy to improve the welfare of Acehnese. Contrary, the special autonomy funds that cannot be implemented properly-affected to the poverty in Aceh-is not significantly decreased. This study aims to determine the failure of special autonomy funds to decrease poverty in Aceh. Methodology: This research used descriptive qualitative methods by conducting the primary data through interviews, also secondary data through books, journals, newspapers, and other related sources. The analysis data is doing by using Transactional Political Theory. Main Findings: The results of this study indicate that asymmetric decentralization can be seen from the weak Regional Economic Growth Rate and the slow improvement of the Quality of Human Development Index (HDI). Thus the failure was caused by two things, namely: the thick Political Content of The Local Political Elite and the Domination of Local Political Elite in the Management of Aceh's Special Autonomy Fund in the Compilation of Planning and Work Programs. The absence of control in the management of special autonomy funds is based on project performance without good planning, and the existence of interest-based planning in the management of special autonomy funds that based on populist activity programs following the wishes of politicians which have an impact on weak regional economic growth, slow index improvement of human development quality, high poverty rates, and high unemployment in Aceh. Applications of this study: The finding of this study offered the evaluation systems for the government of Aceh to strengthen better local government governance, especially in increasing budget planning and implementation efficiency and strengthening regulations, and implementing an e-planning system to select program activities from the Aceh special autonomy fund. Novelty/Originality of this study: Based on the literature review conducted, there were limited publications which are focusing on the failure of autonomy funds in Aceh. Therefore this research will enrich the publication that concerns the failure of managing special autonomy funds in Aceh.

show abstract

Why Decentralization in South Africa Has Failed

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

A diagnostic framework for food system governance arrangements: The case of South Africa

A diagnostic framework for food system governance arrangements: The case of South Africa

Including chiefs, maintaining peace? Examining the effects of state–traditional governance interaction on civil peace in sub-Saharan Africa

Transactional Political Practices in the Asymmetric Decentralization System in Aceh (10-Year Analysis of Special Autonomy Fund Management Period 2008-2018)

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About