Why Democratic Allies Defect Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral Pullouts from the War in Afghanistan

Massie, Justin

doi:10.1080/17419166.2016.1160222

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The conceptual framework advanced in this article seeks to bring into dialogue and make a step towards unifying heretofore separate streams of the literature to improve our understanding of democracies' involvement in MMOs and democratic foreign and security policy, more generally. This includes studies on legislative accountability, parliamentary veto rights, and parliamentary war powers (Born & Hänggi, 2005;Dieterich et al, 2010Dieterich et al, , 2015Peters & Wagner, 2011;Wagner et al, 2010), constitutional and legal writings (Ku & Jacobson, 2003;Nolte, 2003), and works concerned with the actual conduct of democracies as coalition partners in MMOs (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014;Frost-Nielsen, 2017;Massie, 2016b;Schmitt, 2018;von Hlatky, 2013).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

Mello

2018

Contemporary Security Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent scholarship in security studies has started to explore the causes and consequences of various forms of national restrictions in multinational military operations (MMOs). This article makes a conceptual contribution to this literature by developing a theoretical framework of national restrictions in MMOs that distinguishes between structural, procedural, and operational restrictions. I argue that these types of restrictions are governed by different causal mechanisms. Structural restrictions are relatively stable over time and effect deployment decisions irrespective of other factors. Procedural restrictions, on the other hand, can constitute veto points against deployment only in combination with distinct political preferences. Finally, operational restrictions directly affect the rules of engagement of troop contributing countries. The article illustrates the three types of restrictions and their interaction with empirical examples from a range of countries and sketches their impact on MMO deployment decisions and mandates. KEYWORDS Alliances; caveats; domestic politics; institutional constraints; parliamentary war powers; veto points During the Iraq War, Japan's conservative government under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi faced severe constitutional obstacles with its aim to make a military contribution to the U.S.-led invasion. In Afghanistan's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, the German Bundeswehr operated under caveats that prohibited it from joining its coalition partners in the full range of operations by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When chemical weapons were used in Syria in 2013, the British House of Commons effectively vetoed Prime Minister David Cameron's proposal for military action. These examples illustrate how national regulations and conventions can affect democratic decision-making on war involvement and the behavior of the armed forces in the field. 1

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

Mello

2018

Contemporary Security Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…States may further join a US-led coalition operation because they specifically value their alliance relationship with the United States (Davidson, 2011: 15). In contrast with multilateral legitimacy, alliance value entails a concern with the preservation and enhancement of the valued alliance relationship, including the ally's reputation for reliability (von Hlatky, 2013: 44; Massie, 2016: 89; Haesebrouck, 2018a: 257). It entails actively seeking to strengthen the viability, credibility and cohesion of the alliance through military commitment, rather than seeking the approval of a multilateral body such as NATO before taking part in a US-led coalition (Auerswald, 2004: 638).…”

Section: Democratic Participation In Us-led Coalition Operationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Canada Goes to War: Explaining Combat Participation in US-led Coalitions

Massie

2019

Can J Pol Sci

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Canada has taken part in six wars since 1945, all of which have been conducted under US leadership. Despite such military interventionism, there have been no systematic comparative analyses of Canada's decisions to take part in US-led wars. The objective of this article is to develop and test a theoretical framework about why Canada goes to war. More specifically, it seeks to account for variations in Canada's provision of combat forces to multinational interventions led by the United States. It assesses leading theoretical explanations by examining five post–Cold War cases: the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya; the war against ISIS; and the refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq. The article concludes that Canada's willingness to go to war is shaped primarily by a desire to maintain transatlantic alliance unity and enhance Canada's alliance credibility. Threats to national security, the legitimacy of the intervention, government ideology and public opinion are not found to consistently or meaningfully shape Canadian decisions to take part in US-led wars.

show abstract

“…In other words, there should be an upcoming election for opposition leaders to propose an alternative foreign policy (Tago ). Opposition parties may then seize the opportunity to mobilize public opposition to the ongoing military commitment by promising troop withdrawal upon forming government (Massie , 92).…”

Section: Elite Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, according to U.S. Ambassador David Jacobson, the Canadian government sensed it had “done more than its share” and could withdraw its combat troops in 2011 without fear for its improved status as a reliable ally (cited in Massie , 104).…”

Section: Premature Withdrawal: the Collapse Of Elite Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alliance Value and Status Enhancement: Canada's Disproportionate Military Burden Sharing in Afghanistan

Massie

Zyla

2018

Politics & Policy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In choosing not to free ride while the United States was in Afghanistan, second-tier powers like Canada challenge conventional accounts of military burden sharing. To elucidate the puzzle posed by excessive military contributions, the article considers two explanatory factors: alliance value and status seeking. We pair them with insights on elite consensus to explain Canadas desire to have a large role in the war in Afghanistan. We argue that it is expected to support U.S.-led military operations and contributes more than its relative power if it seeks recognition of an elevated status by valued alliance members. Absent elite consensus, however, state executives may have difficulty implementing their status enhancement objectives. We further demonstrate the value of our reasoning by confronting it with the everincreasing factor of threat perceptions. We conclude by stressing that ideational motivations for intra-alliance burden sharing pose a serious challenge to conventional accounts of state contributions to U.S.-led military interventions.

show abstract

Why Democratic Allies Defect Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral Pullouts from the War in Afghanistan

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

Why Canada Goes to War: Explaining Combat Participation in US-led Coalitions

Alliance Value and Status Enhancement: Canada's Disproportionate Military Burden Sharing in Afghanistan

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About