Why did Italy contribute to UNIFIL II? An analytical eclectic analysis

Cladi, Lorenzo; Locatelli, A.

doi:10.1017/ipo.2018.10

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…The latter's answer to the renewed Franco-German partnership followed the example set by Renzi. This complies with the long-lasting tradition of Italian diplomacy, launching and hosting multilateral summits to gain prestige(Cladi and Locatelli 2019). During Gentiloni's time in office, important diplomatic meetings took place in Italy such as the G-7 Summit in Taormina in May 2017 (D'Ignoti 2017).…”

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confidence: 54%

Italy in the EU after Brexit: carrying through or taking a bet?

Cladi¹,

Locatelli²

2021

Politique Européenne

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This article explores the possible repercussions of Brexit upon Italian foreign policy. Whilst Italy has not modified its foreign policy fundamentally following the result of the 2016 referendum on Brexit, we argue that Brexit has, however, led to a change in the European balance of power. This has exposed Italian foreign policy, which has had to adjust accordingly. Successive Italian governments, from Matteo Renzi's to Giuseppe Conte's first cabinet, have had to rethink, design and implement a new role for Italy among the EU top countries. They had to do so as they faced the common prospect of losing an ally such as the UK, which has often proved instrumental in counterbalancing continental European powers. Nevertheless, we observe that the ruling coalitions differed in their response to Brexit. We argue that a neoclassical realist approach aides in understanding the way in which the Italian response to Brexit has been influenced by two key factors: the need to preserve Italy's status in the European balance of power and the governing coalitions' commitment to delivering their electoral promises. The result is that Italian governments pursued a different approach to Italian foreign policy after Brexit, and the implications are discussed.

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supporting

confidence: 54%

Italy in the EU after Brexit: carrying through or taking a bet?

Cladi¹,

Locatelli²

2021

Politique Européenne

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“…Paolo Gentiloni's reaction to the Franco-German partnership has followed a similar path (Felsen 2018). In fact, it is in line with the long-established style of Italian diplomacy, which is based on launching and hosting multilateral summits to raise the international prestige of the country (Cladi and Locatelli 2019): in his 18-months tenure, Italy hosted a number of highlevel diplomatic meetings, such as the G-7 Summit in Taormina, in May 2017. With reference to the European context, Gentiloni tried to capitalize on the ceremony held in Rome on 25 March 2017 to celebrate the 60 th anniversary of the Rome Treaties.…”

Section: Between France and Germany: Italy's European Foreign Policy ...mentioning

confidence: 78%

Explaining Italian foreign policy adjustment after Brexit: a Neoclassical realist account

Cladi

Locatelli

2020

Journal of European Integration

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Drawing on a neoclassical realist approach, this article delves into the impact that Brexit is likely to have on Italian foreign policy. We argue that there are two areas of issue, which are particularly affected by Brexit. Firstly, the Italian relationship with France and Germany.Secondly, Italian defence policy within the European context. Although Italy has not appeared to have significantly changed its foreign policy course after the British referendum, policymakers in Rome have been concerned by the risks that Brexit entails for the country, and have reacted accordingly. We will observe the variation in governmental interest of three ruling coalitions which have alternated in power since 2016 and, through a neoclassical realist approach, we argue that the Italian response to Brexit has been shaped by both the international pressure to preserve its standing in Europe and the need shared by all governments to keep up to their electoral promises.

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“…Several studies explore this transformation in Italian security and defence policy, employing different theoretical approaches and analytical perspectives (Cladi and Webber, 2011;Rosa 2014). Scholars identify the quest for prestige as the main driver of the Italian contribution to multilateral operations (Carati and Locatelli, 2017;Cladi and Locatelli, 2019). A few works investigate how political parties positioned on the issue, highlighting a substantial bipartisan consensus between the main centre-left (PDS-DS-PD) and centre-right parties (Forza Italia) (Calossi and Coticchia, 2009;Coticchia, 2011;Ignazi et al, 2012;Coticchia and Vignoli, 2018;Vignoli, 2019).…”

Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The barking dogs: junior coalition partners and military operations abroad in Italy

Vignoli

2020

Riv. ital. sci. polit.

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Various studies explored under which conditions junior coalition partners are able to have an impact on foreign policy outcomes. However, these parties do not always manage to get what they want. In this situation, they face a dilemma: defecting or staying? In the Italian context, as far as Military Operations Abroad (MOA) are concerned, the latter option has invariably prevailed. In particular, Italy's involvement in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999) and Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011) raised considerable contestation from junior partners that did not result in the termination of the respective cabinets. Employing extensive qualitative data, including a set of original interviews with relevant policymakers, this article aims to understand why junior partners did not defect in these two cases. The empirical findings highlight a variation in parties' motivations according to their ideological leaning: while extreme-left parties were afraid of being punished by their own voters for leaving the cabinet because of the participation in the operation in Kosovo, the far-right and autonomist Lega Nord did not consider opposition to the military intervention in Libya as a salient issue. Therefore, the article has considerable implications for the research agendas on the party politics of military interventions and government termination.

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Why did Italy contribute to UNIFIL II? An analytical eclectic analysis

Cited by 5 publications

References 42 publications

Italy in the EU after Brexit: carrying through or taking a bet?

Italy in the EU after Brexit: carrying through or taking a bet?

Explaining Italian foreign policy adjustment after Brexit: a Neoclassical realist account

The barking dogs: junior coalition partners and military operations abroad in Italy

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