Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism

Abstract

After decades of multiparty politics, Turkey is no longer a democracy. A theory-upending case, the country has descended into a competitive authoritarian regime under the Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), despite rising income and education levels and strong links with the West. What accounts for democratic breakdown in such an unlikely case? Instead of ideological and institutional factors, we offer a political economy account. We contend that the coalitional ties that the AKP forged with businesses and the urban poor through the distribution of public resources has altered the cost of toleration for the party leadership and their dependent clients, while reducing the cost of suppression for incumbents. This new political calculus led to increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government through securitization of dissent, mounting repression, and systematic violation of civil liberties.

Party Organizations Around the Globe. Introducing the Varieties of Party Identity and Organization Dataset (V-Party)

“…Regarding Turkey's AKP, which has been in power since 2002, our V-Party data suggests that it expanded its organization by investing in local branch structures through which the party maintains highly active community presence (Baykan, 2018), and by cultivating close ties to prominent civil society associations (Esen & Gumuscu, 2020). Furthermore, the data shows increasing concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of its leader, Tayyip Erdogan (Yardımcı-Geyikçi & Yavuzyilmaz, 2020).…”

A gendered analysis of trends in the faith‐based provision of social services: Evidence from Egypt and Turkey

“…The new social welfare system is now characterized by several features. First, all public transfers were placed under the control of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, and the process of identification, timing, location, and the amount of the transfers became clientelist (Buğra, 2010; Çavdar, 2022; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2020). Clientelism is defined as a hierarchical relationship in which a government distributes benefits in return for political support (Stokes et al, 2013).…”

Political climate and regional well-being in Turkey

“…Kumbaracıbası (2019Kumbaracıbası ( , 2020 validate the dominant leader oriented clientelistic networks during the AKP ruling period in the 2000s. Esen and Gumuscu (2020) define a triangular clientelism link: (i) Urban poor relies on AKP for social transfers, (ii) Business elites rely on AKP for business contracts, tax reliefs, etc. and urban poor as a base for cheap labor, (iii) AKP relies on urban poor for votes and business elites for private resources and indirect media support.…”