2018
DOI: 10.1080/13662716.2018.1495063
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Why do entrepreneurs refuse venture capital?

Abstract: Despite the evidence on the positive effect of venture capital (VC) on portfolio firm performance, such evidence badly pulls up alongside the non-negligible number of entrepreneurial firms that chooses to refuse VC. This is the first study that investigates the determinants behind the missed realizations of VC investor-investee dyads by focusing on the Italian VC market. We theorize and empirically document that entrepreneurs' human capital background and venture-specific characteristics influence the decision… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
1
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5

Relationship

1
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 7 publications
(1 citation statement)
references
References 113 publications
0
1
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Differently from independent VC funds that, despite being minority shareholders, are active partners (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy Iii, & Vetsuypens, 1990; Bottazzi, da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; Croce, Grilli, & Murtinu, 2019; da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Klein, Chapman, & Mondelli, 2013; MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989) because of specific contractual clauses (e.g., veto right) that create a wedge between cash flow rights and control rights, PVC investors typically display voting rights which coincide with their cash flow rights (Hirsch & Walz, 2013). In addition, they often take a nonvoting observer seat in their portfolio ventures' board of directors, or, more in general, they do not usually claim any form of residual control (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Differently from independent VC funds that, despite being minority shareholders, are active partners (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy Iii, & Vetsuypens, 1990; Bottazzi, da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; Croce, Grilli, & Murtinu, 2019; da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Klein, Chapman, & Mondelli, 2013; MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989) because of specific contractual clauses (e.g., veto right) that create a wedge between cash flow rights and control rights, PVC investors typically display voting rights which coincide with their cash flow rights (Hirsch & Walz, 2013). In addition, they often take a nonvoting observer seat in their portfolio ventures' board of directors, or, more in general, they do not usually claim any form of residual control (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%